

Islam/Muslims and Political Leadership

Mojtaba Mahdavi

Islam is a general law regulating the order of this world and the next (Al-Banna 1983).

The Caliphate has nothing to do with the divine project, and for that matter neither does the administration of justice and the other functions of government and the state. These are specific political projects with which religion has no concern; Islam has neither recognized, condemned nor forbidden them, leaving us to make up our minds on the basis of reason, the experience of nations and the rules of politics (Al-Razeq 1983).

We can not have a science of sociology that is essentially religious or a philosophy that is essentially Islamic or Christian; likewise we can not have a system of government that is essentially religious (Soroush 1995).

The republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam (Iqbal 1982).

Introduction

The demand for a democratic political leadership and the resurgence of Islamism are two salient features of contemporary Muslim politics. Islamists are ironically at the forefront of pro-democracy movements in many Muslim-majority states. Whether Islamists' demand for a democratic leadership is real or rhetoric remains a different important question. The fact, however, remains that Islamists constitute the major part of the popular opposition movements and would win the popular vote in free and fair elections. Islamists' demand for the creation of an 'Islamic' state/political

leadership is driven by the crisis of post-colonial autocratic secular politics in the Muslim countries. This chapter is an attempt to historicize/problematicize the concept of 'Islamic' political leadership/state. It suggests that there is no universal abstract concept of an 'Islamic' political leadership; what exists in reality is a number of Muslim political leaders/leaderships in different Muslim societies. Like the general concept of political leadership, Muslim's concept must be examined in the particular context of each Muslim society. The concept should be contextualized by examining both the personality and character of political leaders as well as the societal, cultural and organizational context in which the agency of political leaders operates. Political leadership in the Muslim world can be understood through the study of the power relations, not merely in terms of an eternal theological Islamic dogma. The 'Islamic' state/political leadership, put simply, is a post-colonial concept, not an historical entity; it is a by-product of the political leaders' agency as well as the socio-political and cultural structure of a particular Muslim society in the modern world.

In this chapter we will first briefly historicize the religious and political formations of the early period of Islam due to its impact on the current debates on Islam and political leadership. Second, we will problematicize the theoretical debates on the concept of 'Islamic' political leadership/Islamic state. Finally, we will examine the most controversial case of the Islamic political leadership/Islamic state in modern time that is the post-revolutionary Iranian state. The conclusion suggests that no matter where and how it operates, state is a secular political entity, not a religious institution. Islamists in power do not make an *Islamic* state; they establish a particular form of a *Muslim* state/political leadership. This state may be run by an autocratic or a democratic political leader. Moreover, Islamic tradition contains a set of basic ideals and principles which make it highly responsive towards modern principles of democracy. As such a modern Muslim democratic state/leadership is not an oxymoron; it is highly possible.

Historicizing the Islamic Heritage and Political Leadership

The past does not *determine* the present; we must avoid cultural determinism. However, there is little doubt about the relevance of the past to the present debates about Islam and politics. The question is to what extent Islamic heritage plays a major role in the contemporary practice of political leadership in the Muslim world. Historically, the Prophet Mohammad's death (632 CE) created a crisis of authority, a leadership vacuum. The dispute over leadership led to division in sectarian trends, 'making the issue of political authority the core of sectarian and factional schisms in Islam' (Tamaddonfar, 1989, 75). The major dispute over the succession (Caliphate/*Khilafah*) to the Prophet Mohammad led to tense political controversy. The Muslim community (*ummah*) elected Abu Bakr, Mohammad's close companion, as the leader. Ali, Mohammad's cousin, closest relative and his son-in-law, bypassed this position but was elected as the fourth leader. To Ali's Partisans (Shi'a/Shiite), the Prophet had selected/appointed Ali as the best candidate for the leadership of

the Muslim community; he was the only legitimate leader. The major issue at the centre of the sectarian and factional disputes remained the question of leadership. Eventually, the two major sects, Sunnism and Shiism developed their own distinct leadership doctrines: Caliphate (*Khilafah*) and Imamate (*Imamah*).¹

When Mohammad passed away, the Shiites argued that the Prophet appointed/selected his successor. This formed the basis of the doctrine of appointment/selection (*Wisaya*) and/or *Imamah*. Shiites thus accepted Ali and his progeny as the successors/*imamas*. The Sunnis rejected the selection/*Wisaya*, because neither the Quran, nor the Prophet's tradition (*Sunnah*) points in any explicit way to any reference to Mohammad's responsibility for choosing his successors. Sunnis believe that the Quran simply states that the most suitable person is to be appointed as caliph, but did not refer to any procedure for appointment. This meant that the formulation of the procedure was the responsibility of the community at large.

The Sunni Doctrine of Leadership: Caliphate/*Khilafah*

The legitimacy of political leaders is a point of contestation among different sects and schools of Islam. Although they agree on some sources of leadership legitimacy, there are disagreements on the basic definition of these sources. In general, the legitimacy of the leader is understood as personal qualities, performance and mode of succession to power.

Khilafah in Sunnism refers to the institution that is responsible for the leadership of the *ummah* after the Prophet. In the post-Prophet era, the title of the Muslim leader was caliph/*Khilafah*, meaning the successor to the Prophet. It is generally agreed among Muslims that the first four caliphs, the Rightly Guided Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman and Ali), were more committed to the Islamic text (Quran) and the Prophet tradition (*Sunnah*), thereby they hold a special position in Muslim history. Following the first four caliphs, the institution of the caliphate continued through two dynasties, the Umayyads (661–750) and Abbasids (750–1258). The Mongol conquest of Baghdad (1258) terminated this period of the caliphate but the caliphate was revived in a new form of the caliph/sultan under the Ottoman Empire in the ninetieth century. The Revolution of the Young Turks put an end to the Ottoman caliphate and the institution of caliphate in general.

In the traditional/orthodox teaching of Sunnism on the doctrine of the *Khilafah* the leader is expected to have certain physical, psychological/moral and social/philosophical qualities. The doctrine originally rejected any divine association

¹ In addition to the two major sects/schools of Islam, one can refer to the *Mu''Tazila* School which maintained that it was a requirement of reason and not a religious/Shari'a requirement to create a state; however, they did not develop an alternative theory of state. The *Kharijites* were only interested in the application of the Shari'a but had no interest in the existence of a state/leadership. They argue that if the Muslim community could establish justice under the Shari'a without a political leader, there would be no need for a leader/*imam*.

between the *Khilafah* and God. Mohammad and the early four *Khilafahs* were simply known to be humans with superior qualities; they made no claims to divinity, with the exception of Mohammad. The later *Khilafahs*, however, gradually claimed divine association in order to justify their legitimacy. Another source of legitimacy is the ability of the *Khilafah* to enforce Islamic laws and to consider *maslah* (common good/communal interests). According to Sayyid Qutb (1974, 123), the *ummah's* acceptance of the *Khilafah* depends upon the level of loyalty of the latter to the *Shari'ah*. When the *Khilafah* deviates from the *Shari'ah* the *ummah* no longer has to follow him, according to the Quran.

The traditional Sunni theory of leadership, caliphate/*Khilafah* stems from two doctrines: the first is the 'doctrine of delegation, which considers leadership as a delegated right from God – the absolute Sovereign – and man – His vicegerents – to the leader'. The second one is the 'doctrine of obligation, which makes it incumbent upon the followers to obey their leaders, since leaders' authority derives from God's absolute sovereignty' (Tamadonfar, 1989, 78). Accordingly, the caliph's authority is delegated by God and thus rules out man's absolute sovereignty. Sunnis are divided over the scope and nature of the doctrine of obligation, although they generally agree on the doctrine of delegation. The orthodox position favours the *ummah's* absolute obedience to authority and its total passivism. Mohammad al-Ghazali, for example, considers the primary needs of the community to be law and order, which, according to him, makes it preferable to have a tyranny over chaos. Others favour obedience to authority on the condition that this authority rules according to Divine Law. This view rejects passivism and affirms the *ummah's* right 'to disobey and oppose those leaders who do not comply with Islam' on the grounds that the Quran and the *Sunnah* encourage the *ummah* to disobey the leaders if they are unjust (Iqbal 1983, 252, 255).

The current debates on the concept of caliphate differ profoundly from its classical version, which 'was viewed in essentially monarchical terms'. The new meaning of the term 'caliphate' has received increased attention in the second half of the twentieth century. In this new meaning, a caliph/*Kilafah* 'is a deputy, representative, or agent' (Esposito and Vall 1996, 25). The Pakistani Islamist and significant Sunni Muslim scholar, Abu al Ala-Mawdudi, utilized the concept of caliphate/*Khilafah* for his interpretation of Islamic democracy. *Khilafah*, Mawdudi argues, means 'representation. The real position and place of man, according to Islam, is that of the representative of God on this earth; his vicegerent' (Esposito and Vall 1996, 26). According to Mawdudi, the authority of command belongs to God, and thus no one is obliged to obey orders given by men in their own right. Similarly, Sayyid Qutb, another Sunni Islamist thinker, attributed absolute sovereignty to God: 'There is no ruler save God, no legislator, no organizer of human beings save God. From Him alone is received all guidance and legislation, all systems of life, norms governing relationships and the measure of values'. In this view, the doctrine of delegation is antithetical to the doctrine of popular sovereignty. However, the community, as the vicegerent of God, is entitled to delegate communal leadership to anyone it chooses (Haddad 1983, 77). The implication is that a caliph is a caliph because the community/*ummah* has granted him political authority. This delegation

of authority is composed of the following: the communal consultation body (*shura*), consensus (*ijma*) and oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*). These give the *Khilafah* a similarity with democratic structures, since its practical application is based on the consent of all Muslims, or the majority of them.

Related to the doctrine of *Khilafah* are the three concepts of *shura*, *ijma* and *bay'ah*. During his rule, the Prophet Mohammad sought for the advice and consultation of his companions. The concept of consultation (*shura*) refers to Islamic belief that the right of the *ummah* to administer its affairs is to be done through mutual consultation. Since the *Shari'ah* is not explicit on the modes of succession to power, it is the community's task to determine the procedure by which the caliph is chosen. The Sunnis give the community this right to vote for their leader. According to Mawdudi, the doctrine of *shura* is deemed extremely important because of its ability to evaluate the caliph's actions, and to prevent him from ignoring the *Shari'ah* rules and interests of the community. Mawdudi (1955) argues that the choice of the caliph should be based on the free will of the people, and most importantly, should be based on an egalitarian principle. Similarly, the concept of consensus (*Ijma*) originally designated the unanimous opinion of the any generation of Muslims on a religious issue; this would portray an authority (*hujjah*) that ought to be accepted by future generations of Muslims. This practice has also been used in the political realm. *Ijma*, like *shura*, justified the community's role in the management of its affairs as the vicegerent of God, but did not formulate any specific procedure for affirming people's will. Moreover, disagreements about sources of the authority, the essence and the scope of *ijma* eventually blurred this idea in Sunni political thinking. These disagreements were mainly about two issues: 'the degree of communal obligation to follow past consensus, and whether *ijma* is the consensus of the community at large or that of just a selected few' (Tamadonfar, 89). In Abu Nasr Farabi's view, the consensus of the community does not always lead to the truth or justice. In reality, there have been times when *ijma* was not able to protect laws and coincide with communal needs, and thus has resulted in usurpation and injustice (Najjar, 1961, 61). Likewise, the concept of oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*) is referred to as the adoption of Islam. Once the leader is chosen by the community or by the notables, *bay'ah* is transmitted to the caliph. The concept of *bay'ah* obliges the *ummah* to render obedience to the *Khilafah*/caliph who will govern the *ummah* in accordance with the *Shari'ah* and the interest of the *ummah*.

In sum, the Sunni doctrine of leadership maintains that caliphate is elective and does not partake in the dogma and theology of Islam. The Shi'i doctrine of leadership, as we will see, is different from that of its Sunni counterpart: it considers the leadership or *imamate* as a part of the Islamic theology and the leader/*imam* is chosen by God.

The Shiite Doctrine of *Imamate/Imamah*

The Shiite doctrine of *Imamate* implies that the leaders (*imams*) in the line of Ali's descendents were the only legitimate leaders but were excluded from the political

process in the post-Prophet era. The infallible *imam* is designated by God and selected by His last Prophet to lead the *ummah*. He holds a divine authority to bring in unity and justice. In the Shiite history, each *imam* was murdered by the illegitimate and brutal leaders of Ummayyads or Abbasids.² The twelfth *imam*, Mahdi/Messiah/Awaited One disappeared and will return at the end of time to bring justice and unity to the world. In his absence, the leadership of the Muslim community rests on the clerical class (*ulama*). The hidden Imam's authority is exercised on his behalf by *ulama*.

The Twelver Shiism calls for the continuity in divine leadership in post-Prophet era. According to the orthodox/traditional doctrine of Shiism, leadership began with the Creation and will finally reach its goal with the return of the twelfth *imam*; the final stage is preceded by three other stages: the first period is that of the prophecy (*nubuwwah*) which started with Adam and continued through Mohammad's prophecy and his leadership. The second period is the *imamah*, which began with Ali and ended with the small occultation of Mahdi, during which leadership belonged to the twelve *imams* and Mahdi's deputies. The third period begins with the occultation of Mahdi and ends on the Day of Resurrection. There is no consensus over the Shiite theory of leadership at this stage. Some have stated that leadership belongs to the public; others believe it belongs to the few enlightened and learned individuals. At the final period of leadership, a universal revolution will occur to facilitate Mahdi's return and Mahdi's leadership will bring justice to society.

The Shiites developed various doctrines of *imamah*, but they did not address the need for a pragmatic foundation for permanent leadership. Although the Shiite accepted the leadership of Ali and his descendants, they have not developed a unified theory of the leadership in the absence of the last *imam*. With the exception of Ali, the Shiite *imams* were excluded from the leadership role in temporal affairs. Thus, to most Shiite jurists the Shiite *imams* were mainly considered the spiritual leaders of the community. This widened the gap between theory and practice of leadership in Shiism.

According to the mainstream view of *imamah*, the legitimacy of the *imam* is directly related to his superior human attributes, which are inherited from his divine descendency and allow him to understand the esoteric meanings of the *Shari'ah*. The source of the *imam's* legitimacy is different from that of the caliph, because the *imam* only possesses qualities that he has inherited through his Mohammad lineage – this means he will be appointed by the ruling *imam* rather than by communal consent or will. The caliph is a temporary ruler, and his effectiveness depends upon his familiarity of the inner meanings of the *Shari'ah* and his compliance with the divine' (Tamaddonfar 92, 100).

The political position of Shiism has been a combination of quietism and activism. The Shiite establishment has often chosen to pursue a quietist apolitical position. The new Shiite scholars and activists took a different position: they adopted an

2 The Shiites are divided into three major sub-divisions: Twelvers, Ismailites and Zaidis. Twelvers comprise the majority of the Shiites.

elitist approach. Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih* (Guardianship of the Jurist) is a case in point, where the Shiite theory implies that a Muslim jurist must take the leadership of the Muslim community and create an Islamic state in the absence of the Hidden Imam. He openly rejected the well-established Shiite tradition of quietism and advocated for political activism. Khomeini stated that the communal leadership was justified in both the Quran and Mohammad's *Sunnah*. According to Khomeini (1356/1978, 27, 111), 'a collection of legal codes is not sufficient for the improvement of the society. For the law to become the source of improvement and success of humanity there is a need for an executive power'. Khomeini continued by stating that since leadership was very important for political authority, God Himself appointed Mohammad and his successors as the executive authority, and bestowed upon the community the *Shari'ah*. Just as Mohammad's rule was important, so was that of *imams*. According to Khomeini, the *vali-ye faqih* has the function of the supervisor of limited legislative issues, as well as executive and judicial ones, similar to that of the Prophet and *imams*. The *fuqaha*, given their superior knowledge and moral qualities, are most qualified to check if the believer is conforming to the *Shari'ah* and, if need be, decide on punishment.

Ali Shariati (1358/1980), a modern Shiite scholar, argued that there is a need for leadership of the community towards reaching to its collective goal. He argued that the community's survival and proper functioning fundamentally rely on responsible leadership committed to the ideals of Islam and to an efficient quest towards achieving communal goals. Both Khomeini and Shariati, although from a different perspective, used the concept of *imam* in the Weberian sense of charismatic authority.

There is no consensus among the Muslims on the indispensability of the *ulama* in the Islamic community. Likewise, there is little agreement on the structure and function of the clerical establishment even among those who accept the role of the *ulama*. The modern Sunni scholar, Qutb, did not believe in the role of professional clergy/*ulama*, because Islam has no professional clergy: 'the Kingdom of God on earth will not be established when religious leaders supervise sovereignty on earth as was the case under the power of the church, nor by men who pontificate in the name of Gods as was the case under 'theocracy' or divine rule' (Haddad, 81, 91). Mawdudi (1976), another modern Sunni scholar, endorsed theocracy, but he stated that Islamic theocracy is based on the rule of the whole community and not the theologians. Ali Shariati (1357/1979), a modern Shiite scholar, strongly rejected theocracy; Ayatollah Khomeini (1981) and other supporters of the theory of *velayat-e faqih* supported a strong role of the *ulama* in political leadership.

The Prophet Mohammad, in sum, was accepted by the *ummah* not only because of his divine appointment, but also because he was a charismatic leader with superior qualities and leadership skills. He was also a spiritual leader, who brought forward the essential principles and premises of Islam to the people, a man with managerial skills in state affairs, who established the basis of an administration and ruled according to its principles. The first successors to the Prophet, especially the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs (*Khulafa al-Rashidin*) attempted to follow Mohammad's principles and were perceived as religious and political leaders of the community. A transformation occurred in the later stage: the bureaucratization of the *Khilafah*

system, the hasty heterogeneity of the *ummah* and the later centrifugal tendencies in the Islamic empire all contributed to the decentralization of the powers of the caliph. This was an important stage, because the decentralization of power led to the separation of the political and religious authority. It was with the Umayyad rule that this separation of power was recognized; thus they ruled primarily as political leaders and left the religious leadership to the *imamas* and the *ulama*. In other words, they were not *Islamic states*. As Abdullahi An-Na'im (2008, 7) points out, 'although the states that historically ruled over Muslims did seek Islamic legitimacy in a variety of ways, they were not claimed to be 'Islamic states'.

In Shiism, none of the *imams* who ruled after Ali exercised temporal power. Some came to terms with their role as religious and spiritual leaders of their communities, and accepted the caliph's political leadership. Others, however, rejected the political situation and defended their right to temporal authority. In practice, the quietist approach to temporal authority was pursued by most Shiite leaders. The process of de-politicization of the *imam's* leadership in Shiism reaches its peak with the occultation of the twelfth *imam*, Mahdi. 'The practical doctrine of occultation enabled the Shiite leaders to postpone the realization of the Shiite claim to political power indefinitely. Furthermore, it reinforced the earlier position that temporal rule is not an indispensable function of the imam and, thus, accentuated the spiritual and religious functions of the imams' (Tamaddonfar 1989, 115). In the post-*imamate* period, the Shiites have accepted that there is no *imam* but that of Mahdi. However, as the case of Ayatollah Khomeini suggests, the lack of consensus over the issue of political leadership set the stage for the *ulama's* claim to political leadership on behalf of the Hidden Imam.

Having historicized two major classical Islamic doctrines of leadership, it is time to turn into the modern debates about how and whether the past determines present debates on Islam and politics, religion and democratic political leadership in the Muslim world.

Islamic or Muslims' Political Leadership?

There is little disagreement over the primacy of politics in modern Islamic movements. 'The Muslim consciousness has a certain leaning towards politics' (Enayat 2005, 1). However, there is a common misconception, if not fantasy or fiction, about the historical reality of the fusion of Islam and politics: it is that all Muslims' attitudes and institutions have Islamic sanctions because Islamic tradition and politics are *essentially* and inherently linked together. It is important to distinguish between facts and fiction, theory and practice, and the ideal and reality in the Muslim politics.

There is a body of literature on the Middle East and Islamic studies called Orientalism, which constructs a monolithic, fundamentally static, homogenous entity and a conceptually unique Islamic civilization. In this view the fact of 'Muslim Exceptionalism' indicates that the Islamic leadership is an authoritarian

one because in Islam God is Caesar and the Quran and Mohammad's Tradition dictate some fixed eternal authoritarian rules on the Muslim community (Said 1987). According to Asef Bayat (2007, 6), three factors have contributed to the currency of such an 'exceptionalist' view in the study of the Muslim countries. The first is the 'continuing relevance of Orientalist/essentializing thought in the West'. The second is 'the persistent authoritarian rule' in the Middle East, supported by the West. And the third is the emergence of 'Islamist movements that have often displaced socially conservative and undemocratic dispositions'.

Such a cultural essentialist view implies that Islamic tradition and modern democracy are incompatible and the public role of Islam would ultimately result in an autocratic form of government. The political implication is that Islamic tradition and modern democracy are incompatible; the public role of Islamic tradition violates a democratic leadership. This approach is shared by many Western Orientalists and a group of Muslim apologists/extremists. They suggest that the crisis of modernity and the absence of democracy in the Muslim world is the fact of 'Muslim Exceptionalism'. On this view modernity, rationalism and democracy are Western in origin and uniquely suited to Western culture. Ernest Gellner, among others, argues that Muslim societies are essentially different from others in that 'no secularization has taken place in the world of Islam' (Gellner 1991, 2). In *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* he argues that Islam has been exceptionally immune to the forces of secularization and modernization has actually increased this immunization (Gellner, 1992). Likewise, Bernard Lewis (1990) and Samuel Huntington argue that Western culture is unique and essentially different from other civilizations in general and Islam in particular. While 'in Islam, God is Caesar', in the West 'God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual and temporal authority, have been a prevailing dualism' (Huntington 1996, 70). According to Huntington, 'the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and obsessed with the inferiority of their power' (Huntington 1996, 217).

The Orientalist argument implies that a democratic leadership is a 'civilizational achievement of the Christian West and therefore not easily transferable to other civilizations other than through Western hegemonic imposition or through the conversion to Western norms' (Casanova 2001, 1050-51). As such, it is not *Islamic fundamentalism* but the *fundamental* essence of Islam that makes it incompatible with a democratic leadership. Similarly, for Bernard Lewis the inevitable fusion of religion and politics is something that historically and intellectually attach to Islam (Lewis, 1988). Implicit to his argument is that 'Islamic mind' and democratic leadership are mutually exclusive.³

In his critique of cultural essentialism Nasr Hamed Abu Zeid (2002) argues,

It is hard to accept the claim that there is something inherently wrong with the 'Islamic Mind'. To speak about an 'Islamic Mind' in abstraction from all constraints of geography and history, and, in isolation from the social and

3 For best models of this approach, see Huntington 1996; Lewis 2003; Lewis 1993.

cultural conditioning of Islamic societies, can only lead us into unrealistic, even metaphysical, speculations. Instead, it is more realistic to look for the root of this panic reaction to critique in the crisis of modernization and complicated relationship between the Islamic world and the West.

On the other side of the spectrum, some home-grown Islamist essentialists are suspicious of democratic leadership as an alien, foreign concept to Islamic culture. Islamic leadership/state, in their view, favours God sovereignty at the cost of people's will. The founding father of the Iranian post-revolutionary state, Ayatollah Khomeini, introduced his theory of the *velayat-e faqih* (the Guardianship of the Jurist) into the existing modern structure of state. The theory implies that 'Islamic government does not correspond to any of the existing forms of government' (Khomeini 1981, 61), because 'the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administrating the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Quran and the *Sunnah* of the Most Noble Messenger' (Khomeini 1981, 55). Moreover, Ayatollah Khomeini refused to add the word 'democratic' to the title of Islamic Republic of Iran. He argued Iran's political system would be 'the Islamic Republic, not one word less, not one word more' (Khomeini 1981).

Similarly, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (2002), Ayatollah Khomeini's successor, describes the exclusive merits of so-called Islamic democracy. When the twelfth Shiite *imam* known as Mahdi returns from his occultation, the Ayatollah argues, he will rely on the pious to lay the foundation for a universally popular government; 'but this popular government is *totally different* from the governments that claim to be popular and democratic in today's world ... The world's democracies are based on propaganda, whereas the democracy of the Lord of the Age [the twelfth Shiite *imam*, Madhi], religious democracy, is *totally different*'. In reality, however, what makes this polity different from the world's democracies is that the highest authority that is the office of the *velayat-e faqih* is exclusively held/run by a male clerical Muslim jurist (*faqih*). The scope of people's rights and the degree of people's inclusion are subject to the interpretation of the *faqih*. The nature of people's sovereignty remains ambiguous and instrumental in the hands of political authorities.

Both Western Orientalists and some Islamists, to use Talal Asad's (1997, 190–191) remarkable insight, share 'the idea that Islam was originally – and therefore essentially – a theocratic state'; but for the Islamists 'this history constituted the betrayal of a sacred ideal that Muslims are required as believers to restore'; and for the Orientalists 'it defines a schizophrenic compromise that has always prevented a progressive reform of Islam'. The Islamic state is not that much product of some Islamic essence as 'it is the product of modern politics and the modernizing state'.

According to Norris and Inglehart, the data and empirical evidence suggest that 'when political attitudes are compared far from a clash of values, there is a minimal difference between the Muslim world and the West' (Norris and Inglehart, 2004, 154–5) and they are 'similar in their positive orientation toward democratic ideals'. More importantly, 'support for democracy is surprisingly whispered among Islamic publics, even among those who live in authoritarian societies'. The empirical evidence, as Norris and Inglehart argue, urges 'strong caution in generalizing from

the type of regime to the state of public opinion'. Authoritarian political leadership, Islamist or otherwise, do not represent the state of Muslims' public opinion.

The question, as Bayat (2007, 10) points out, is not whether Islam is or is not incompatible with a democratic leadership, 'but rather under what conditions Muslims can *make* them compatible'. There is nothing essentially and inherently autocratic or democratic in Islam; it is the people, socio-political agents, who determine the nature of our polity and political leadership. In the end, 'religion is expressed by means of human ideas, symbols, feelings, practices, and organizations' (Beckford 2003, 2). Moreover, Muslim societies are not peculiar or unique in their religiosity; they should not be measured by the 'exceptionalist' yardstick of which religio-centrism is the central core' (Bayat 2007, 6). Muslim societies hold hybrid identities, which include various degrees of religious affiliation, national cultures, socio-economic structure, historical experiences and political settings. In short, the essentialist, scripturalist, ahistorical approach to the study of Muslim politics is misleading. The question of Islam and democratic political leadership is not 'as much the question of texts as the balance of power' (Bayat 2007, 13) between those who want a democratic leadership and those who prefer an autocratic one in a Muslim country. Fred Halliday (1996, 116) argues that:

There is nothing specifically 'Islamic' which hinders democratic polity in the Muslim societies; though some of these obstacles 'tend to be legitimized in terms of Islamic doctrine ... [Any argument about incompatibility or compatibility between Islam and democracy adopts] the false premise that there is one true, traditionally established 'Islamic' answer to the question, and this timeless 'Islam' rules social and political practices. There is no such answer and no such 'Islam'.

For Halliday (1994, 96), Islam is so broad that:

It is possible to catch almost any fish one wants. It is, like all the great religions, a reservoir of values, symbols and ideas from which it is possible to derive a contemporary politics and social code: the answer as to why this or that interpretation was put upon Islam resides therefore, not in the religion and its text itself, but in the contemporary needs of those articulating Islamic politics.

Having examined both classical and modern debates on Islam and political leadership, it is useful to look at the most controversial case of Islamic political leadership in modern time: the Islamic Republic of Iran.

How Theocratic is the Islamic Republic of Iran?

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the most important example of a 'modern' Islamist state, and therefore deserves much attention in the debates on Islam and political

leadership. Let us first define what the Islamic Republic of Iran is not, and then turn to what the Iranian state/political leadership stands for. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the post-revolutionary Iranian state is not a traditional Islamic state for a number of reasons: first, the term 'Islamic state' is conceptually an oxymoron as Islam never introduced a state model. Thus, the Islamic state, as it is claimed to be, is a modern phenomenon invented by contemporary Islamists, and is not congruent with historical Islam. As such, the essentialist position of both Muslim apologists and Western Orientalists is neither conceptually nor historically accurate. Secondly, in theory Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of the *velayat-e faqih* was a major departure from historical Shiite Islam; it does not represent mainstream Shiism. Thirdly, Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of the Islamic state, Sami Zubaida (1997, 118) argues, proved to be 'Islamic in its personnel' at best, since the institutional forms of the Iranian state have no 'particularly Islamic features'. Not only does the Islamic *Shari'ah* 'constitute only one element among many', but Ayatollah Khomeini favoured a relatively dynamic interpretation of the *Shari'ah* in the socio-economic policies of the Republic. More importantly, the interests of the state and of the statesmen trumped the rulings of the Islamic *Shari'ah*. In 1989, Ayatollah Khomeini explicitly argued that the state ruled by the *vali-ye faqih* who, if necessary, can stop the implementation of the *Shari'ah* and dismiss the founding pillars of Islam in order to protect the general interests of the state. Ayatollah Khomeini himself, acting in the general interests of the state, established an institutional body for the identification of the interests of the state (the Expediency Council), accordingly accepted the 1988 ceasefire with Iraq, removed Grand Ayatollah Shariat-Madari from his religious rank and Ayatollah Montazeri from his political career, and eventually ordered the amendment of the Constitution in order to drop the religious condition of the *marja-i yat* (the source of emulation) for the future leadership of the Islamic Republic.

As such, the state founded by Ayatollah Khomeini is by no means a revival of Islamic tradition or a reassertion of traditional Islamic values. Many scholars (such as Ervand Abrahamian, Sami Zubaida, Ali Mirsepassi, Mansoor Moaddel, Asghar Schirazi and H. Chehabi, among others) suggest that *Khomeinism*, and consequently the state he founded, is a modern construction. For Mansoor Moaddel (1993, 257–62), the Khomeinist state is a form of 'third world fascism', because both states share similarities in 'ideology': 'the relative autonomy of the state' and 'the system of police repression'.

Ervand Abrahamian (1993, 92) identifies *Khomeinism*, and thus the state he institutionalized, with 'populism'. Like other populist movements, he argues, *Khomeinism* was 'mainly a middle-class movement that mobilized the masses with radical-sounding rhetoric against external powers and entrenched power-holding classes, including the comprador bourgeoisie'. In his recent work, however, Abrahamian (2004, 114–115) put more emphasis on the so-called Islamic nature of the state. The constitution of the Islamic Republic, he argues, ensures 'equality of man and women before the law', 'equal job opportunity' and individual rights 'regardless of race, color, language or creed'. The constitution also 'implicitly incorporated the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the French Declaration of

the Rights of Man and Citizen'. It avoided, however, describing these "as natural rights". To have done so would have undermined the notion that all rights were derived from divinity'. For this reason, Abrahamian argues, the Islamic Republic 'is a mishmash of traditional theocracy and modern democracy'.

Similarly, Chehabi (2001, 48, 51) suggests that 'Iran is the only example of a post-traditional theocracy'. And yet, the concept of theocracy is not helpful in pointing out the nature of the Iranian state because, writes Chehabi, 'God does not exercise His sovereignty directly', and therefore,

... a group of men rule in His name. These men may indeed believe that they do not act in their own interests and are instead instruments of the unfolding of a divine plan – but Communist leaders also claimed to act in the name of historical necessity ... which does not prevent us from analyzing their mode of rule independently of the bases of legitimacy which they claimed.

Furthermore, 'Iran is not ruled by the clergy but by a politicized section of it', given the separation of political and religious leadership in the post-Khomeini era.⁴ As such, the intellectual foundation of the Islamic Republic fits neither a traditional-Islamic state (theocracy), nor a modern fascist state, nor a solely populist state.

Iran's post-revolutionary state, in spite of its initial attempts, failed to establish a totalitarian state; 'Iran's totalitarianism was stillborn' (Chehabi 2001, 54). According to Chehabi, the Iranian state lacks major features of totalitarian government as defined by Carl Friedrich. The Iranian state failed to maintain an 'official ideology', given the growing pragmatic tendencies in domestic and foreign policies of the state. More importantly,

Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), which theoretically is the basis of the dominant ideology and hence of all legislation, addresses only a limited range of issues and these almost all fall into the realm of private law. Traditional Islam has very little to say about many questions of public policy, which means that Islamists have to invent a lot by deducing rules and regulations from principles that do not address those issues. And since they engage in this act of invention on the basis of a religion that admits of distinct interpretations, they inevitably disagree with each other (Chehabi 2001, 56).

Hence, because Islam is not an ideology there is hardly any substantive content to so-called Islamic ideology in the politics of the state. The Iranian state is short of another hallmark of totalitarianism: a modern single-mass centralized political party. The Islamic Republican Party clearly failed to fulfil such a role and was dissolved in the mid-1980. The decentralization of the Islamic faith and openness to diverse interpretations, together with elite factional politics, contributed to the

4 Even under Ayatollah Khomeini's leadership, all leading Ayatollahs overtly or covertly opposed the idea of *velayat-e faqih*. Some of them were under house arrest. See Chehabi 2001, 52.

development of limited pluralism in the Iranian state and prevented the success of totalitarian tendencies (Chehabi 2001, 59–60). By the same token, a relative diversity of opinion in the press and the existence of the independent private sector in the economy suggest that the state does not exhibit two other features of totalitarianism. The last hallmark of a totalitarian state is terror, and yet 'terror is not specific to totalitarian regimes and can also appear in authoritarian ones'. According to Linz (1999), there is 'no correlation between the use of terror and the type of non-democratic regime'. In sum, if the intentions were realized, the Islamic Republic might have been a totalitarian system; however, 'such an outcome was prevented by the organizational and ideological peculiarities' of the post-revolutionary state (Chehabi 2001, 69). More precisely, the Islamic Republic has failed to establish a totalitarian state due the pressures of Iranian society.

Having defined what the Islamic Republic is not, it is time to define it in positive terms. A closer look at the institutional arrangements of the Islamic Republic leads us to a better understanding of the nature and the type of the state. 'The state in the Islamic Republic of Iran', as Mehdi Moslem (2002, 35) put it, 'is unique in its institutional arrangements and distribution of power', because the state is 'multilayered and institutionally diffused'. This distinctive institutional arrangement, to use Daniel Brumberg's phrase (2001), is 'dissonant institutionalization', which at once combines Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih* with the Republican institutions inherited from Iran's 1905 Constitution and adapted from the constitution of French Fifth Republic. Iran's distinctive feature, characteristic among non-democratic regimes, Chehabi (2001, 64) argues, is that it holds 'regular parliamentary and presidential elections in which voters have a genuine (but limited) choice'. Given its Republican institutions, the Islamic Republic seems to share more features with contemporary modern Western states than with theocracy. In practice, however, the Republican institutions are subordinated to the rule of the *vali-ye faqih*. Unlike parliamentary democracies, the parliament in the Iranian state must share its legislative authority with the Guardian Council, whose jurist members are appointed by the *vali-ye faqih*. 'In fact the constitution clearly states that without the existence of the Guardian Council, the *Majles* is devoid of sovereignty.' The *Majles* must also share its legislative authority with the Expediency Council whose chair and most members are appointed by the *vali-ye faqih*. Similarly, unlike presidential democracies, the president in the Islamic Republic is ranked next to the *vali-ye faqih*. Article 113 of the Constitution suggests that 'after the leader, the president is the highest official in the country'. Furthermore, the *vali-ye faqih* holds many institutional 'extended arms' (Schirazi, 1997, 73–5), ranging from the powerful Revolutionary Foundations to the parallel institutions accountable not to the Republican institutions, but to the *vali-ye faqih*. The Iranian state, as discussed above, is neither a democratic nor a totalitarian regime; the regime maintains a mixture of 'authoritarian' and semi-democratic features.

Iran's limited political pluralism is best represented in the two-tier electoral system in which 'candidates are screened, genuine opposition candidates are prevented from running and political parties are discouraged' (Chehabi 2001, 65). Citizens are implicitly divided into two groups of insiders (*khodi*) and outsiders

(*gheir-e khodi*), the latter being excluded from meaningful political participation. This is enforced in practice by the Guardian Council. Moreover, as in post-totalitarian Eastern Europe, the ideological mentality of the Iranian state is weakened, largely due to the 'discrepancy between the constant reiteration of the importance of ideology and the ideology's growing irrelevance to policy making or, worse, its transparent contradiction with social reality' (Chehabi 2001, 67). Furthermore, the relative decline of intensive political mobilization in the post-Khomeini era indicates that the state remains less totalitarian and more authoritarian. Last but not least, the extent and limits of leadership in the Iranian state is 'formally ill-defined', leaving different levels of the leadership with their own mentality and thus creating tensions within the system. The elite factionalism and the inner contradictions in the constitution contributed to such leadership diversity. As Chehabi (2001, 69) points out, three top clerical leaders of Iran's reformist regime subscribed to different versions of the Islamic Republic: the *vali-ye faqih* Khamenei was in favour of a totalitarian state; the Chair of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani, favoured 'a variation on Janos Kadar's famous (post-totalitarian) dictum 'those who are not against us are for us'', and President Khatami was more proximate to democracy. As such, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chehabi (2001, 48–9) argues,

... like totalitarian regimes, proclaims the absolute supremacy over the public life of an ideology, i.e., Islam; like authoritarian regimes it permits a limited degree of pluralism; and like democracies it holds elections in which the people sometimes have a genuine choice; to wit Mohammad Khatami's upset victory in the presidential elections of May 1997.

Hence, the Islamic Republic synthesizes totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, authoritarianism and democracy. Under Ayatollah Khomeini's rule, the state was more inclined to totalitarianism, while in post-Khomeini Iran it has gradually transformed to 'early' post-totalitarianism.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is often identified as a theocracy but seldom characterized as a rentier state. Contrary to most expectations, 'oil dependency' has increased under the Islamic Republic due to the lack of economic diversity in the non-oil economy, and the domination of inefficient state-owned enterprises and the revolutionary foundations (*bonyads*) over Iran's economy (Karshenas and Hakimian 2005, 74–6). In the Islamic Republic oil exports dominate both the balance of payments and government fiscal revenues, while the share of manufactured exports has remained only 9 per cent (Karshenas and Hakimian 2005, 72). Like the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic Republic remains a rentier state and derives its financial power not from citizens' taxes but rather mainly from oil resources. This makes the state capable of shaping and controlling social-political forces without their consent. After the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini invoked 'the invisible aid of Allah' to consolidate the post-revolutionary polity. 'This invisible aid conveniently materialized in the form of massive crude oil deposits beneath the sands of the Iranian plateau, which continue to provide the regime with a crucial margin of flexibility even amidst economic crisis' (Rahnema

and Moghissi 2001, 1). Oil can be an obstacle to democracy when it substitutes for the people's voice. It is true that the vicious cycle of autocracy and economic corruption existed long before the discovery of oil in the early 1900s. It is also true that in a rentier state with oil-driven politics the power of oil and petro-dollars remains central in shaping the state's relations with civil society. The Islamic Republic of Iran, like its predecessor, has used this power, making the state a domain dominated by particular rent-seeking interests. The Khomeinist state is a rentier state privileged by petro-dollars, oil revenues and rents to impose certain policies, to subsidize and import certain goods, to buy loyalty at home and abroad, to organize anti-democratic groups, and to make and unmake public policies in the interests of the clerical authority. Iran's autocratic rentier state has subsidized and supported all Revolutionary Foundations (*bonyads*), supervised and controlled by the office of *velayat-e faqih*, with a gross annual income of almost half that of the state budget (Amuzegar 1994, 100). The state has frequently allocated monopoly rights to import and export certain commodities to its loyal supporters. The rentier-state with a broker (*dallal*) economy has produced a new class whose interests and survival rest on the survival of the state. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in sum, 'is a mishmash of traditional theocracy and modern democracy'; it is by no means a revival of Islamic tradition or a reassertion of traditional Islamic values; it is a modern invention of Islamists with no 'particularly Islamic features' and proved to be 'Islamic in its personnel' at best.

Conclusion: Towards an Islamic Democratic Political Leadership?

Political leadership/state is a secular political entity. It is not a 'religious institution in the historical experience and current reality of Islamic societies'. Islamic political leadership/state is a 'post-colonial innovation based on a European model of the state'; it has no precedence in Islamic history. In other words, 'the state is not an entity that can feel, believe, or act itself. It is always human beings who act in the name of the state' (An-Na'im 2008, 1, 7, 11). For this reason, Islamic state is a secular entity ruled by Islamist elites who act and speak on behalf of their human interpretation of Islam. They may act in accordance with democratic or authoritarian principles. The fact remains is that political leaders, not abstract dogmas, speak or act for the state.

Muslim politics is not as easy to pin down for various reasons: the majority of Muslims are often silent/silenced; in addition to the silence/silenced majority, there are varying voices in the Muslim debates: the most important division is between the secular Muslim and Islamist approaches. Among the Islamists, there are also several positions both in South Asia and the Middle East. Some Islamists seem to be more authoritarian and some have come to conclude that democratic institutions allow more participation and therefore they favour democracy. They utilize Islamic heritage to justify their current democratic position. Moderate Islamism has absorbed and 'Islamized' the notions of democracy, pluralism and

human rights. They try to build a bridge between modern Western notions and the medieval doctrines in Islam of notions of democracy, pluralism and human rights. For some Islamists their 'preference for democracy is perhaps more political than theological' (Khan, 2006, 153). However, the argument is that 'the notions of democracy, pluralism, and human rights are not only in harmony with Islamic thought, but their seeds are embedded in many notions of government and politics found in Islamic religious thought' (Moussalli, 1999, 5). Islamic concepts such as justice, equality, human dignity and consultation remain in harmony with modern principles of democracy, pluralism and human rights. Islam contains a set of basic principles which make it highly responsive towards many of the moral and legal prerequisites of democracy. Hence, political leadership in the Muslim world remains open to democratic norms without negating its own religious and ideological heritage.

There are currently 'two prominent examples of governing systems reemerging after they had apparently ceased to exist'. One is democracy; the other is the Islamic state (Feldman 2008, 1). Although, the very notion of the Islamic state is a conceptually contested concept, the fact is most Islamists propose that they aim to reconcile these two governing systems and to establish an Islamic democratic state/political leadership. Both Islamists and secular citizens need to take a few important steps to achieve this goal. A substantive and sustainable Muslims'/Islamic democratic leadership requires mutual understanding, dialogue and pluralism: in the Muslim world both secularists and religious citizens must avoid cultural essentialism. Secular citizens need to understand that their fellow religious citizens can appreciate freedom, democracy and social justice and even extract these ideals from their religious soils. Religious citizens should know that extracting ideals such as democracy and social justice from religious texts does not make them religious concepts; they are neither religious nor anti-religious notions. 'We cannot have a system of government that is essentially religious.' But we can have governors/political leaders who are both religious and democrats. Likewise, secularists should stop essentializing such concepts by suggesting that religious traditions and modern democracy are mutually exclusive. Instead, they need to support progressive, democratic Islam/Muslims.

Islamists or citizens of the faith should learn from their fellow secular citizens that the institutional separation of religion and politics is a necessary condition for a modern democracy. The secularists need to learn that the intellectual and mental separation of religion and politics is neither possible nor desirable. Instead, they should know that in a 'post-metaphysical' or 'post-secular' era, as Jurgen Habermas reminds us, secularists 'must open their minds to the possible truth content' of religious discourses and enter into 'dialogues' with their fellow religious citizens. According to Habermas (2005), 'post-metaphysical thought draws, with no polemical intention, a strict line between faith and knowledge. But it rejects a narrow scientific conception of reason and the exclusion of religious doctrines from the genealogy of reason'; in other words, it 'is prepared to learn from religion while remaining strictly agnostic'. Secular citizens should distance themselves from the post-Enlightenment cliché which suggests that religious traditions are 'archaic

relics of pre-modern societies that continue to exist in the present'. The 'ethics of citizenship,' Habermas argues, requires that both religious and secular citizens stop behaving in an uncivil and 'paternalistic' way, and step into a 'complementary learning process'.

References

- Abrahamian, Ervand (2004), 'Empire Strikes Back: Iran in US Sights', in Bruce Cumings, Ervand Abrahamian and Moshe Ma'oz (eds), *Inventing the Axis of Evil* (New York: New Press).
- — — (1993), *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Abu Zeid, Nasr Hamed (2002), 'Heaven, Which Way?', *Al-Ahram*, 603, September, 12–18.
- Al-Banna, Hassan (1983), 'The Credo of the Muslim Brotherhood', in Anouar Abdel-Malek (ed.), *Contemporary Arab Political Thought* (London: Zed Books).
- Al-Razeq, Ali-Abd (1983), 'The Caliphate as a Political Institution', in Anouar Abdel-Malek (ed.), *Contemporary Arab Political Thought* (London: Zed Books).
- Amuzegar, Jahangir (1994), *Iran's Economy under the Islamic Republic* (London: Tauris).
- An-Na'im, Abdullahi (2008), *Islam and the Secular State* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press).
- Asad, Talal (1997), 'Europe against Islam: Islam in Europe', *The Muslim World*, 87, 2 (April), 183–95.
- Bayat, Asef (2007), *Islam and Democracy: What is the Real Question?* (Amsterdam: University Press).
- Beckford, James (2003), *Social Theory and Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Brumberg, Daniel (2001), *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Casanova, J. (2001), 'Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam', *Social Research*, 68, 4 (Winter), 1041–1080.
- Chehabi, H.E. (2001), 'The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative Perspective', *Government and Opposition*, 36, 1 (Winter), 48–70.
- Enayat, Hamid (2005), *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (London: Tauris).
- Esposito, John, and John Vall (1996), *Islam and Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Feldman, Noah (2008), *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Gellner, Ernest (1994), *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (New York: Penguin).
- — — (1992), *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion* (New York: Routledge).

- — — (1991), 'Islam and Marxism: Some Comparisons', *International Affairs*, 67, 1 (January), 1–6.
- Habermas, Jürgen (2005), 'Religion in the Public Sphere', lecture presented at the Holberg Prize Seminar 29 (November).
- Haddad, Yvonne Y. (1983), 'Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival', in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Halliday, Fred (1996), *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation* (London: Tauris).
- — — (1994), 'The Politics of Islamic Fundamentalism: Iran, Tunisia and the Challenge to the Secular State', in A.S. Ahmed and H. Donnan (eds), *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity* (London: Routledge).
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the Modern World* (New York: Simon & Schuster).
- Karshenas, M., and H. Hakimian (2005), 'Oil, Economic Diversification and the Democratic Process in Iran', *Iranian Studies*, 38, 1 (March), 67–90.
- Khamenei, Ali (2002), Speech on the Anniversary of the 12th Shiite Imam, 22 October.
- Khan, Muqtader (2006), 'The Politics, Theory, and Philosophy of Islamic Democracy', in Muqtader Khan (ed.), *Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory and Philosophical Perspectives* (Rowman & Littlefield).
- Khomeini, Ruhollah (1981), 'Islamic Government', in *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, trans. and annotated by Hamid Algar (Berkeley: Mizan).
- — — (1356/1978), *Nameh-i az Imam-i Mussavi, Kashif al-Ghita* (Tehran: n.p.).
- Iqbal, Javid (1983), 'Democracy and the Modern Islamic State', in John L. Esposito (ed.), *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Iqbal, Muhammad (1982), *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Lahore: Ashraf).
- Lewis, Bernard (2003), *What went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East* (New York: Perennial).
- — — (1988), *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- — — (1993), 'Islam and Liberal Democracy', *Atlantic Monthly*, February.
- — — (1990), 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', *Atlantic Monthly*, September.
- Linz, Juan (1999), 'Types of Political Regimes and Respect for Human Rights: Historical and Cross-National Perspectives', in Asbjorn Eide and Bernt Hagtvet (eds), *Human Rights in Perspective: A Global Assessment* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Mawdudi, A. (1976), *Political Theory of Islam* (Lahore: Islamic).
- — — (1955), *Islamic Law and Constitution*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Karachi: Jamaat-e-Islami).
- Moaddel, Mansoor (1993), *Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Moslem, Mehdi (2002), *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press).

- Moussalli, A. (1999), *Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida).
- Najjar, Fauzi M. (1961), 'Farabi's Political Philosophy and Shi'ism', *Studia Islamica*, 14, 57–92.
- Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart (2004), *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Qutb, Sayyid (1974), *Maarakat al-Islam wa-al-Rasmaliyyah*, 4th edn (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq).
- Rahnema, Saeed, and Haideh Moghissi (2001), 'Clerical Oligarchy and the Question of "Democracy" in Iran', *Monthly Review*, 52, 10 (March).
- Said, Edward (1987), *Orientalism* (New York: Pantheon).
- Sayyid, Bobby S. (1997), *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of Islamism* (London: Zed Books).
- Schirazi, Asghar (1997), *The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic* (London: Tauris).
- Shariati, Ali (1358/1980), *Collected Works*, vol. 26 (Tehran: Chappakhsh).
- — — (1357/1979), *Collected Works*, vol. 1 (Tehran: Chappakhsh).
- Soroush, Abdolkarim (1995), 'Mana va Mabnaye Secularism' ['The Meaning and the Basis of Secularism'], *Kiyan*, 26, August–September.
- Tamadonfar, Mehran (1989), *The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership: Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Pragmatism* (Boulder CO: Westview).
- Zubaida, Sami (1997), 'Is Iran an Islamic State?', in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds), *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report* (Berkeley: University of California Press).