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One Bed and Two Dreams? Contentious Public Religion in the Discourses of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati

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Abstract: Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati are seen as twin pillars of revolutionary Islam in contemporary Iran. This article contextualizes and compares these radical discourses in three sections. It first problematizes the transformation of Khomeini as a quietist cleric into a revolutionary ayatollah. While Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih* was a radical departure from the dominant Shiite tradition, its practice has contributed to a new era of post-Khomeinism. Second, it examines Shariati's discourse and a new reading of his thought in the post-revolutionary context. Third, it demonstrates that these discourses differ radically on the three concepts of radicalism, public religion, and state. The conclusion sheds some light on the conditions of Khomeinism after Khomeini, and Shariati's discourse three decades after the revolution. It suggests that Iran has gradually entered into a new era of post-Islamism.

Résumé : L'ayatollah Khomeiny et Ali Shariati sont considérés comme deux piliers de l'islam révolutionnaire dans l'Iran contemporain. Cet article contextualise et compare ces discours radicaux en trois sections. Il problématise la première transformation de Khomeiny en tant que clerc quiétiste dans un ayatollah révolutionnaire. Alors que la théorie de Khomeiny du *velayat-e faqih* est une rupture radicale avec la tradition dominante chiite, sa pratique a contribué à une nouvelle ère de l'après-khomeynisme. Deuxièmement, il examine le discours Shariati et une nouvelle lecture de sa pensée dans le contexte post-révolutionnaire. Troisièmement, il démontre comment ces discours

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différent radicalement sur les trois concepts du radicalisme, de la religion publique, et de l'État. La conclusion met en lumière les conditions du khomeynisme après le discours de Khomeiny et Shariati trois décennies après la révolution. Il suggère que l'Iran a progressivement entré dans une nouvelle ère du post-islamisme.

Keywords
Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Shariati, public religion, radicalism, *velayat-e faqih*, neo-Shariati discourse, post-Islamism

Mots clés
L'ayatollah Khomeiny, Ali Shariati, la religion publique, le radicalisme, le *velayat-e faqih*, le discours néo-Shariati, le post-islamisme

Introduction

Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution, and Ali Shariati, the teacher of the revolution, are seen as two intellectual pillars of Islamic radicalism in contemporary Iran. This article seeks to compare, contrast, and contextualize these twin pillars of the radical and revolutionary discourse in Iran in three sections. First, we will study Ayatollah Khomeini's politico-intellectual journey from quietism to political absolutism. We will examine the transformation of a quietist cleric into a radical and revolutionary ayatollah – a man whose theory of *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of the jurist) was a radical departure from the dominant traditional trends in Shiism. We will also problematize Khomeini's controversial legacy after Khomeini. Second, we will examine Ali Shariati's discourse followed by a critique of a new reading of Shariati's thought. Third, we will compare and contrast these two discourses on the three concepts of radicalism, public religion, and state. The conclusion examines the conditions of Khomeinism after Khomeini, and Shariati's discourse three decades after the 1979 revolution. It suggests that both discourses have contributed, in a distinctive way, to a shift from Islamism to *post-Islamism* in post-revolutionary Iran.

I. Ayatollah Khomeini: From Political Quietism to Political Absolutism

The politics, perspective and personality of Ayatollah Khomeini have been central in the making of a revolutionary Islamist discourse. Ayatollah Khomeini's discourse, however, was almost half a century in the making: his thinking evolved over five distinct stages, beginning with political quietism and concluding with political absolutism.

Khomeini the Quietist (1920 s–1940 s). Ruhollah Khomeini, born into a clerical merchant family in Khomein in southwestern Iran, achieved prominence among the students of Ayatollah Abd al Karim Haeri (d. 1936), and received the degree of *ijtihad* (independent judgment in legal matters) in 1936 (Algar, 1981: 14). He was only thirty-three when he became known as the *marja-e taqlid*, meaning the source of emulation. Khomeini as a *marja-e taqlid* and a teacher did not restrict himself to the conventional teachings and

habits of the *madraseh* (the seminary). By the 1940 s Khomeini became a master synthesizer. In Qom's Feyziyeh Seminary he offered an unconventional curriculum, bringing together the study of mysticism (*erfan*), philosophy (*falsafeh*), ethics (*akhlaq)*, and Islamic law (*sharia*). Not only was he practicing how to combine *erfan* and politics, but he was insisting on reconciling two opposing schools in clerical thought, *erfan* and *sharia*. Khomeini was "one of the few to have reached the stature of a leading jurisprudent, the highest level of theoretical mysticism, and also to have become a highly-regarded teacher of Islamic philosophy. He was unique in being at the same time a leading practitioner of militant Islam'' (Moin, 1999: 46–47).

The young Khomeini's attitude to politics, however, was congruent with the long established apolitical tradition of the clerical institution. Political quietism and social conservatism best represent the dominant tradition of clerical Shiism. In this tradition the clerical establishment deferred to the monarchy. According to the traditional understanding of the doctrine of the *Imamat*, the leadership of the community rests solely with the *imam*. The last/twelfth *imam*, who went into hiding/occultation in 874, is the sole legitimate leader of the community, and it is believed he shall eventually return to establish the rule of Islam.[1] In the meantime, the *ulama* (clerics) guide the community in religious matters, and remain responsible for the protection of the faith. Although a few members of the clerical establishment, such as al-Karaki and Majlisi II, were politically active after the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, the clerical establishment remained largely apolitical, meaning it never proposed an alternative polity to the ruling authorities. Political quietism in the mainstream Shiite tradition, writes Hamid Enayat, resembles the pragmatic logic of "Sunni realism," meaning that the "supreme value in politics [is]. . . not justice but security – a state of mind which sets a high premium on the ability to rule and maintain 'law and order' rather than on piety" (Enayat, 1982: 11). Nonetheless, because the authority of the hidden *imam* is passed to the *ulama*, the argument goes, they exclusively understand and interpret the *sharia* law. This suggests that "while power might lie with the temporal body, authority would naturally devolve onto the jurists." The Qajar dynasty (1794 to 1925) recognized this authority, but the Pahlavi monarchs (1925–1979) did not; this eventually caused tensions in state–clergy relations under the Pahlavi dynasty (Ansari, 2003: 225). After the death of Ayatollah Haeri in 1936, Ayatollah Mohamad Hossein Buroujerdi (d. 1961) became the supreme religious authority in Iran. Khomeini remained a quietist cleric so long as Ayatollah Buroujerdi, an important religious authority and a strong advocate of clerical quietism, was alive. The young Khomeini, although frustrated by Reza Shah's secular reforms, remained quietist, relying on the Shiite practice of *taqīyah* or dissimulation, which permits people to deny their faith in order to continue its practice (Moin, 1999: 56). In 1941, due to his pro-German stance, the Allies replaced Reza Shah with his son, Mohamad Reza. The young Shah accepted religious activities in order to contain the supporters of the communist Tudeh Party connected with the Soviet Union. The clerical establishment appreciated the new regime's policy, as it sought to strengthen clerical institutions. The young Ayatollah was not an exception; he welcomed the change and remained quietist.

Khomeini the Constitutionalist (1940 s–1971). Khomeini's transition from quietism to constitutionalism was prompted by the fear of secularism undermining the traditional role of

the *ulama* in society. As a political activist, Khomeini's first public statement came in a book published in 1941. The book, titled *Kashf al-Asrar* (The Discovery of Secrets), was essentially a detailed, systematic critique of an anti-religious tract, but it also contained passages that were critical of the anti-religious policy of the Pahlavi monarch. In this small polemical book Khomeini attacked secularism, Reza Shah's anti-clerical policies, and a group of clergy who had offended the clerical establishment.[2] The book became the first statement of Khomeini's view on both constitutionalism and the Islamic state. "Government," Khomeini argued, "can only be legitimate when it accepts the rule of God, and the rule of God means the implementation of the *sharia*" (Khomeini, 1941: 291). But Khomeini did not challenge the institution of monarchy and remained a constitutionalist. He sought a supervisory (*nezarat*) role for the *ulama*. This was in accord with Article 2 of the 1906 Constitution, suggested by Shaykh Fazlollah Nouri, which provided for a clerical committee to supervise laws passed by the *Majles* (Parliament). If on rare occasions the *ulama* criticized the regime, writes Abrahamian (1993: 20), "it was because they opposed specific monarchs, not the 'whole foundation of monarchy.'"

In *Kashf al-Asrar* the form of government was not Khomeini's main concern as long as the *sharia* law was enforced. Khomeini described the legal procedures and the constitutional arrangement in line with his constitutionalist approach to politics. He argued that

> if we say that the government (*hokuma*t) and guardianship (*velayat*) is today the task of the *fuqaha* (religious jurists), we do not mean that the *faqih* (jurist) should be the Shah, the minister, the soldier or even the dustman. Rather, we mean that a *majles* that is... [run] according to European laws... is not appropriate for a state... whose laws are holy.... But if this *majles* is made up of believing *mojtahids* who know the divine laws and... if they elect a righteous sultan who will not deviate from the divine laws... or if the *majles* is under the supervision of the believing *fuqaha*, then this arrangement will not conflict with the divine law. (Khomeini, quoted in Brumberg, 2001: 58)

Khomeini was clearly absent from politics in the years from 1951 to 1953; he was unfriendly towards the nationalist movement led by Mohammad Mosaddeq in the 1950s. Khomeini was disappointed with the politics of quietism and was inspired by Islamist militants' idea of Islamic universalism, but remained politically inactive and never publicly criticized Ayatollah Buroujerdi's policies. It appears in retrospect that he understood that he had to establish "his credentials as a prominent religious leader before moving on to the political arena in order to both strengthen his standing within the religious establishment and widen his power base in general" (Moin, 1999: 66, 68).

Khomeini's real entry into politics came in 1962–1963 after the inauguration of the Shah's reforms, known as the White Revolution. Ayatollah Buroujerdi's death in 1961 opened up a space for Khomeini's involvement in politics, and also left the religious institution with no single successor. Given the presence of older ayatollahs, Khomeini was a junior candidate for Buroujerdi's position. However, he seized the moment and published a collection of rulings on matters of religious practice (*resaley-e tozihol masael*), and with this book he made himself available to be recognized as the *marja-e taghlid*. The Shah regime's difficulties with the White Revolution gave him the opportunity to emerge as a leading clerical opponent. Khomeini attacked the new electoral law

enfranchising women as un-Islamic, and the referendum endorsing the White Revolution as an *unconstitutional* procedure (Abrahamian, 1993: 10). In response the Shah sent paratroopers to attack Feyziyeh *Madraseh*, the religious seminary where Khomeini taught. The school was ransacked, Khomeini himself was arrested, and some students died. For Khomeini, this event showed the regime's hostility towards Islam and the clerical establishment. Khomeini was released from prison in 1964 and soon denounced the Shah's tyrannical regime as being subordinate to US interests in Iran. When the Shah granted legal immunity to American personnel for offences committed on Iranian territory, Khomeini furiously condemned this policy as humiliating to Muslims in their own country. In his words, "if someone runs over a dog belonging to an American, he will be prosecuted. . . . But if an American cook runs over the Shah, the head of the state, no one will have the right to interfere with him. Why? Because they wanted a loan and America demanded this in return" (Algar, 1981: 181). Khomeini was again arrested in 1964, and sent into exile in Turkey and then to Najaf, Iraq's most important Shiite shrine city. While in exile in Najaf, Khomeini maintained his influence among some Muslim political organizations inside Iran. In *Kashf al-Asrar* Khomeini had argued in 1941 that the clergy should provide legal and moral guidance and not become politically involved. In return, the clergy expected respect for the *sharia* and the clerical establishment. Khomeini's view as a constitutionalist remained unchanged until the 1970s despite the events of 1963.

Khomeini the Revolutionary (1971–1979). In the early 1970s, "Khomeini was the first Shiite jurist to open the discussion (*fath-e bab*) of 'Islamic government' in a work of jurisprudence" (Amir Arjomand, 2001: 301). The theory of Islamic government was a point of departure from constitutionalism. Khomeini began to change his position by suggesting that the whole institution of monarchy was illegitimate, and that an Islamic government should rule Muslims. He stated, "the Islamic government is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are bound by a collection of conditions defined by the Qur'ān and the traditions of the Prophet. . . In this system of government sovereignty originates in God, and law is the word of God." He developed, through a series of lectures delivered in Najaf in the early 1970s, the novel idea that a just, knowledgeable, and faithful *faqih*, in the absence of the *Imam*, was obliged to exercise both religious and political power. "The ruler," Khomeini argued, "must have two characteristics: knowledge of the law and justice. He must have knowledge of the law because Islamic government is the rule of law and not the arbitrary rule of persons. In this sense only the *faqih* can be the righteous ruler" (Algar, 1981: 55).

Khomeini's theory of the *velayat-e faqih* was a radical departure from the dominant traditional trends in Shiism (Rajaee, 1983). The theory challenged the conventional Shiite doctrine of *Imamat*, which states that the legitimate leadership of the Muslim community belongs to the Prophet and his twelve successors or *Imams*. Khomeini proposed the novel idea that "our duty to preserve Islam" by establishing an Islamic government "is one of the most important obligations incumbent upon us; it is more necessary even than prayer and fasting." He suggested the task of creating an Islamic government that can be justified on the basis of the "secondary ordinances" (*ahkam-e sanaviye*), where the "primary ordinances," the *sharia* laws, are silent or not explicit (Algar, 1981: 75, 124).

Ayatollah Khomeini established his doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* on two traditional and rational grounds (Zubaida, 2009: 16–17). The government is an essential component of Islam because the Prophet created an Islamic state. Moreover, the *sharia* law cannot be fully implemented without an Islamic state; Islamic government is the only legitimate tool to put the Islamic rules into practice. The Muslims cannot live under un-Islamic rule and the implementation of *sharia* law cannot be stopped during the Great Occultation: "Did God limit the validity of His laws to two hundred years? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation?" (Algar, 1981: 42). The just *vali-ye faqih* is the only qualified ruler to undertake this task after the Prophet and the *Imams*.

Khomeini initially stated that "whatever is in [constitutional] accord with the law of Islam we shall accept and whatever is opposed to Islam, even if it is the constitution, we shall oppose." He then increasingly came to believe that Islam was under greater threat from colonialism, "and thus shifted his emphasis from the constitution to Islam" (Bashiriyeh, 1983: 59–60). He argued that the Pahlavi regime was bent on destroying Islam because only Islam and the *ulama* could prevent the onslaught of colonialism (Khomeini, 1941: 58–60, 68–69). Khomeini eventually rejected constitutionalism and monarchy: "Islam is fundamentally opposed to the whole notion of monarchy," he argued, because it is one of the most shameful "reactionary manifestations" (Algar, 1981: 202).

Why and how did the constitutionalist Khomeini become a revolutionary? Why did it happen in the 1970s? Ayatollah Khomeini remained in close contact with Iran during his years of exile, and was deeply influenced by the waves of new ideas and radical trends in Iran. For example, he will have read Al-e Ahmad's (1923–1969) pamphlet, *Gharbzadegi* (Westoxification), given his frequent use of the term in the late 1970 s (Mottahedeh, 1986: 303). Moreover, Iranians outside the country also played a part in transforming Khomeini's views. In November 1973, Khomeini urged the Iranians to rise against the aggression of the Zionist regime, while the Shah was considered a friend of Israel. He attacked the Shah for creating the *Rastakhiz* Party and opposed replacing Iran's Islamic calendar with the Achaemenid one, known as the *Shahanshahi* calendar. He also condemned the Shah's celebration of the 2,500-year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy, given the painful reality of Iranian society. By the 1970s, Khomeini was transformed into a populist and revolutionary Ayatollah with an ability to communicate with different groups of people.

The socio-political events of the late 1970s pushed Khomeini to become the leader of the revolution. "Acting under another of its erroneous assumptions," the Shah's regime requested the Iraqi government to expel Khomeini "in the hope of depriving him of his base of operations and robbing the Revolution of its leadership" (Algar, 1981: 19–20). Khomeini went to France, which proved beneficial as communication with Iran was easier from France because Khomeini's declarations were telephoned directly to Iran. His speech was articulated in the popular idioms, and therefore united Iran's urban middle class and lower class under his charismatic leadership.

The Shah was ultimately forced to leave Iran for the last time on 16 January 1979, and within two weeks Khomeini returned to Iran. On 1 February Khomeini received a tumultuous welcome in Tehran. Within ten days the old regime collapsed, and Khomeini established a new regime called the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeini the revolutionary would

become Khomeini the *vali-ye faqih*. Ayatollah Khomeini spent the last two parts of his life under a polity he created. He successfully transformed the last monarchy into Iran's first Republic. However, the Republic he founded transformed Khomeini the revolutionary into Khomeini the *vali-ye faqih* (1979–1987) and, eventually, Khomeini the absolute *vali-ye faqih* (1987–1989).

Khomeini the Vali-ye Faqih *(1979–1987).* In the absence of a common enemy, social and political differences in the aftermath of the revolution became more visible. There was division among the Islamists, nationalists of secular thinking, and various groups on the secular left. Each group held different opinions on the future of post-revolutionary politics. For Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, the future could only be an Islamic Republic, but its nature remained undefined. Khomeini wanted to place the theory of *velayat-e faqih* as the leading idea of the revolution, merging clericalism and republicanism. Hence, both concepts were redefined. First, the Shiite ''jurist law'' was ''transformed into the law of the state'' (Amir Arjomand, 2001: 302). In his theory of *velayat-e faqih*, Khomeini redefined the role of the clergy, suggesting that ''in Islam there is... no distinction between temporal and religious powers. He rejects the prevalent notion that the jurists' task should be limited to understanding and interpreting the *Shariat*. They are not the mere collectors of Traditions; rather it is also part of their duty to implement the law.'' In fact, the role of the *Imam*, he suggested, ''should be represented by a *Faghih*, as the sole holder of legitimate authority'' (Bashiriyeh, 1983: 62–63). In other words, Khomeini's definition of politics was an individual's conformity to the *sharia*. For Khomeini, the structure of authority was divine and the state was instrumental in the implementation of the *sharia*. Second, Khomeini also redefined the concept of republicanism in accordance with clerical rule. The people's participation in politics, or republicanism, resembled for Khomeini the traditional Islamic concept of *bayà*, meaning the vote of allegiance to authority.[3]

''Khomeini was not setting up government in a vacuum but was taking over an existing one which had undergone considerable modernization in the course of the twentieth century'' (Amir Arjomand, 2001: 302). To incorporate the theory of the *velayat-e faqih* into state institutions required time and experience. In appointing Mehdi Bazargan, a liberal Muslim, to head the interim government, Khomeini was seeking time and experience for the clergy to eventually lead the new regime and consolidate Khomeinism. In Paris Khomeini said: ''the *ulama* themselves will not hold power in the government,'' but instead ''exercise supervision over those who govern and give them guidance'' (Schirazi, 1997: 24). But by the end of 1979, Iran had a quasi-theocratic constitution, and by the summer of 1981 Khomeini's theory was being put into practice. ''Khomeini's personal role in the gradual transformation of the clergy into a 'clerical regency' – as Bazargan, using the French term, called the new theocracy – was significant'' (Moin, 1999: 247). Khomeini as the *vali-ye faqih* wanted the clergy in the office of the president: the first clerical president and the Islamic Republic's third president was Ali Khamenei, then Secretary General of the Islamic Republican Party, and the future successor of Ayatollah Khomeini.

''Yet the results,'' as Brumberg (2001: 105) put it, ''were far from the theocracy that Ayatollah Khomeini had zealously proclaimed. Instead of producing a coherent

constitutional map, the clerics blended several different ones, thus institutionalizing a new political order based on contending visions of authority," ranging from orthodox to pragmatist to democratic visions. Khomeini's traditional and charismatic authorities were institutionalized in the constitution. The office of the *velayat-e faqih* and Khomeini as the *vali-ye faqih* brought together traditional, charismatic and legal authorities in the making of the Islamic Republic.

The Iran–Iraq war provided Ayatollah Khomeini with an historic opportunity to consolidate his vision of the revolution. The unintended consequences of the eight-year war, the first modern war fought by the Iranian state in 150 years, were to change the state–society relationships and contribute to the re-enchantment of the Iranian society. "If Iranians had entered the war as obedient subjects, they emerged from it with a keener sense of their own relationship to the state" (Ansari, 2003: 239). The legacy of the war was contradictory: it ironically strengthened both state and society, which both emerged with their self-confidence enhanced. To use Charles Tilly's (1985: 181) words, the war was instrumental in "state making," meaning "eliminating and neutralizing" the state's internal political rivals and enemies. And yet the war changed the relations between the state and society, as it simultaneously created a mass society with its demands unfulfilled. More importantly, the Khomeinist state was facing a growing tension between conservative elites or the traditional right, and revolutionary elites. By 1987, it became "too clear that the regime's emphasis on Islam, war, revolutionary discourse, and the persona of Khomeini were insufficient for governing Iran" (Moslem, 2002: 72). The crisis in the economy, the frustration and alienation in society, and the systematic deadlock and ideological factionalism in politics alarmed the regime, pushing the state to take some initiatives for change. "Perhaps more than anyone it was Khomeini who had woken up to this reality: the engine for change was Khomeini himself" (Moslem, 2002: 72). The change was aimed at the consolidation of the Islamic Republic. The institutionalization of the *velayat-e faqih* and rationalization of power, however, did not contribute to democratization, but instead enhanced the power of the *vali-ye faqih*, and made Khomeini more or less into an absolute (*motlaqeh*) *vali-ye faqih*.

Khomeini the Absolute Vali-ye Faqih (1987–1989). Three significant issues exemplified the transformation of Ayatollah Khomeini into the absolute *vali-ye faqih*. In all three issues, Khomeini was concerned about the future of the state he created.

The Absolute Rule of the State over Religion. The elimination of so-called "enemies of the *velayat-e faqih*" brought to the fore divisions within the Khomeinist camp. These revolved "around the soul of the state," that is "the characteristics of the government of *velayat-e faqih*" and "its Islamicity" (Moslem, 2002: 47). The first faction, the conservative or traditional right, backed by the bazaari merchants and the orthodox clergy, held a conservative position on the nature of the Islamic state and "wanted strict implementation of *sharia* in the socio-cultural spheres."[4] The second faction, the revolutionary elites, by contrast "supported state-sponsored redistributive and egalitarian policies."[5] They also believed that primary Islamic ordinances (*ahkam-e awaliye*), derived from the two Islamic sources of the Qur'ān and the Tradition of the Prophet (the *Sunna*), were

insufficient and therefore Muslims living in modern times needed to issue secondary ordinances (*ahkam-e sanaviyeh*) (Moslem, 2002: 48–49). Ayatollah Khomeini trusted both factions. He appointed the six jurist members of the Guardian Council, the legislative body with veto power over the *Majles*' bills, from the conservatives. At the same time he strongly supported the statist-revolutionary bills in the *Majles* and the revolutionary plans provided by then Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Musavi (1980–1989). In the struggle between the two Khomeinist camps, "Khomeini shrewdly pursued his unique policy of 'dual containment'" (Moslem, 2002: 65).

Khomeini's charisma was the backbone of his policy of the "two-handed way," hiding the constitutional contradictions in the institutional setting of the Islamic Republic. By 1987, however, Khomeini's policy of "dual containment" was no longer effective, given the ever-increasing disagreements over economic, socio-cultural, and military policies between the two factions. From December 1987 until his death in June 1989, Khomeini issued various decrees to clarify his socio-political positions and sided with the revolutionary camp.

In December 1987, after continual tensions between the conservative Guardian Council and the revolutionary *Majles* over the tax bill and the labor law, Khomeini intervened and authorized the government to introduce bills essential to the interests of the state. In his speech he insisted, "the state can by using this power, replace those fundamental...Islamic systems, by any kind of social, economic, labor...commercial, urban affairs, agricultural, or other system, and can make the services...that are the monopoly of the state...into an instrument for the implementation of general and comprehensive politics." When then President Ali Khamenei interpreted Khomeini's argument, suggesting that "the executive branch...should have a permanent presence in society...within the limits of Islamic laws and Islamic principles" (Brumberg, 2001: 135), Khomeini harshly responded by blaming Khamenei for misrepresenting his argument and his ruling. In January 1988 he made it clear that

> The state that is a part of the absolute vice-regency of the Prophet of God is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and *haj*. . . . The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any *sharia* agreement that it has conducted with people when those agreements are contrary to the interests of the country or of Islam. (Moslem, 2002: 74)

Khomeini as the absolute *vali-ye faqih* came to the view that all aspects of Islam were subordinate to the interests of the Islamic state. "From now on religion would serve the Islamic state rather than vice versa" (Moin, 1999: 260). For Khomeini, as Brumberg put it, "the *faqih* was not merely the interpreter of the law, but in some sense the *vehicle* of law itself." Khomeini, indeed, "implied that the vice regent of God had the authority to *create* both divine and secondary injunctions" (2001: 135–136). Even though "Khomeini in theory granted new and unparalleled powers to the *faqih*, he at the same time drastically undermined the religiousness of the regime and bolstered its populist-republican dimension." Khomeini provided the state "with the authority to not only intervene in the economy but the right to use its discretion to suspend even the pillars of Islam" (Moslem, 2002: 74).

Ayatollah Khomeini's statement was bold but certainly not new. "Khomeini had long believed in the utilitarian tasks of government and had used the term *interests* in the context as far back as 1941" (Brumberg, 2001: 136). This time, however, he clearly "broke from the historical position of the religious establishment in Iran with regard to state ordinances" (Moslem, 2002: 74). The statement was extremely significant, because Khomeini as the absolute *vali-ye faqih* "by design or default" laid the foundation for greater tensions over his legacy and, indeed, over "the very nature and role of the state." The revolutionary Khomeinists sought to institutionalize "Khomeini's charisma in the *majlis* and government," while the conservative Khomeinists "tried to rescue the idea of charismatic rule by defending the investment of all authority in the *person* of the *faqih*" (Brumberg, 2001: 136–137). Khomeini's exceptional statement in 1988, in sum, seemed to point towards an institutionalization of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* – a pragmatic rationalization, if not secularization, of the political order and the subjection of Islamic rulings to the interests of the Islamist rulers.

The "Poisonous Chalice" of the Peace. "After accepting the ceasefire" in the Iran–Iraq war, reported Khomeini's son, "he could no longer walk. . . . He never again spoke in public. . . and he fell ill and was taken to the hospital" (Moin, 1999: 270). By 1988 Khomeini realized the war was no longer in the interests of the state, and was undermining the very survival of the Republic. Despite his fiery talks against imperialism and the infidel enemy, as the founding father of the Republic Khomeini had no choice but, to use his own phrase, to drink from "the poisonous chalice," and save the state: "How unhappy I am because I have survived and have drunk the poisonous chalice of accepting the resolution. . . . At this juncture I regard it to be in the interest of the revolution and of the system" (Brumberg, 2001: 142).

Ayatollah Khomeini accepted the ceasefire in the summer of 1988 and died in the summer of 1989. During this period Khomeini expressed his "absolute" authority in three specific events. First, following the end of the war, the People's Mojahedin Organization, the opposition group based in Iraq, launched a military attack against Iran. The regime's response was harsh: the Mojahedin's forces were massacred on the battlefronts and several thousand jailed political opponents were executed in the prisons (Abrahamian, 1999). Second, Khomeini's *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* created much tension between Iran and the West. Third, after a decision taken by the Assembly of the Experts in 1985 it was expected that Khomeini's loyal student, Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, would succeed him. Montazeri was the only high ranking cleric who supported Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih*, and contributed in theory and practice to the institutionalization of the *velayat-e faqih*. However, Montazeri frequently criticized the violation of human rights by the regime. He challenged the regime's new reign of terror in the summer and autumn of 1988. Disappointed with Montazeri's reactions, Khomeini asked him to resign and ordered the Assembly of the Experts to meet and make a decision on the future leadership of the Republic. The purge of the only Ayatollah loyal to the doctrine of the *velayat-e faqih* set the stage for the revision and the redefinition of Khomeini's theory of the *velayat-e faqih*.

The Succession: The Rationalization of the Velayat-e Faqih? There was one last work for Ayatollah Khomeini to fulfill before he died in June 1989: his succession. With

Montazeri's dismissal, Khomeini needed to find a successor. The 1979 Constitution was explicit in setting out the theological qualifications of the *vali-ye faqih*, indicating that, in addition to all personal and political qualifications, only one among the Grand Ayatollahs, as the prominent *marjià*, or the source of imitation, could hold the office. The problem was that none among the Grand Ayatollahs was sympathetic to Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih*. Moreover, the leading Grand Ayatollahs lacked the personal charisma or high political qualifications required for the office. However, there were a number of middle-ranking clerics who accepted Khomeini's theory and fulfilled the necessary political requirements. The pragmatic solution was to revise the Constitution to save the Khomeinist state.

The 1989 Constitution was a departure from the 1979 Constitution. It expanded the power of the *faqih* by transferring the president's task of coordinating the three branches of government to the office of the *velayat-e faqih*. It made it explicit that the *vali-ye faqih* holds an ''absolute'' power, by adding the phrase *motlaqeh* to the Articles 107–110, defining his absolute authority. The 1989 Constitution, under Article 110, listed the expanded authority of the *vali-ye faqih*.[6] More importantly, Article 109 of the amended Constitution separated the position of the *marjià* from that of the *faqih*, setting the stage for the selection of a new *vali-ye faqih* who could be a middle-ranking cleric. As specified in Article 109, the *vali-ye faqih* no longer needed to hold the religious qualification of the *marja-e taqlid*, or source of religious emulation. Khomeini's theory of the *velayat-e faqih* ''received a blow, as it effectively, in the long run, separated the position of the 'leader' from the institution of *marja'iyat*, subordinating the latter to the state'' (Moin, 1999: 294).

Paradoxically, the priority Khomeini granted to the interests of the state led him to revise his own theory of the *velayat-e faqih* by reducing the theological qualifications needed, and separating the position of the *marjià* from that of the *faqih*. This surprisingly resulted in the separation of religion from politics! The rationalization of the office of the *velayat-e faqih*, however, did not lead to the ascendancy of democratic authority in the Republic. Rather, it was a boost toward the greater institutionalization of political absolutism.

On 3 June 1989 Khomeini died. The elected Assembly of the Experts appointed Ali Khamenei as the new leader of the Islamic Republic. Khomeini died; Khomeinism, however, survived and became routinized. The routinization of charisma and the succession brought some significant changes to the fate and future of the Khomeinist state. First, religious power shifted from the institution of the *velayat-e faqih* to the religious seminaries, and yet the political authority of the *vali-ye faqih* remained over and above the religious authority of the *marja-e taqlid*. Secondly, power was concentrated not in the hands of a *vali-ye faqih*, but in the office of the *velayat-e faqih*. Thirdly, the routinization of charisma transferred power not to the people, but to the more authoritarian conservative faction of the state.

In his book *Kitab al Asfar* (Book of Journeys), the mystic-philosopher Molla Sadra discussed the ''four journeys'' of purification leading to a state of perfection. Khomeini was fascinated by this notion. He saw this (new) Platonic path of perfection as the path of the Prophet. Drawing upon Molla Sadra's ''four journeys,'' Khomeini discussed this path of perfection in his lectures. The first journey is ''from Mankind to God,'' in which Man

leaves "the domain of human limitations" and purges his soul of all earthly desires. The second journey comes "with God in God"; this means that Man submerges himself in the oceans of secrets and mysteries to acquaint himself with the beauty of God. The third journey is from God to the People, when Man returns to the people but is no longer separate from God, as he can now see His omnipotent essence. And the fourth journey is from people to people, in which Man has acquired Godly attributes with which he can begin to guide and help others to reach God (Moin, 1999: 49–50). In this final stage, prophethood and the perfect man are realized; the perfect man is the *Imam* and he is obliged to establish the *velayat* (guardianship) on earth, guiding the people and establishing an Islamic society. Ayatollah Khomeini's view of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* derives from his lifelong immersion in mysticism and (Platonic) philosophy, which rendered the absolute Truth, God's words, transparent to him. Such a mystical politician is an absolute *political* sovereign capable of overruling the *sharia*. He does not implement or interpret the *sharia*; he enjoys a full political agency/authority to act on behalf of the interest of the state. The interest and survival of the state/statesmen – *faqih*, not the *fiqh* – is the guiding principle of the Islamic state he envisioned. The events following the presidential elections of June 2009 are a case in point, when the doctrine of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* turned the Islamic Republic into a clerical Leviathan accountable only to itself – neither to God, nor to the people, nor to human ethics.

Khomeinism after Khomeini: Multiple Faces of Khomeinism. Ayatollah Khomeini was "a unique product of unique historical circumstances" and thus "irreplaceable." It was "Khomeini who made the institution of the *velayat-e faqih* powerful, not the other way around" (Milani, 2001: 225). Khomeini's charisma was not transferable to a successor. His successor, Ali Khamenei, who was designated by the ruling clergy, had neither religious credential nor charismatic personality, in Max Weber's terms, to be "awakened" or "tested." Thus, unlike Khomeini, who depended on his own charismatic authority, Khamenei was dependent on his conservative peers. Ali Khamenei's "lack of an independent base of support was the critical factor in his selection as the *faqih*; he did not seem threatening to the rival factions. Aware of his shortcomings, Khamenei in the early stage of his rule stayed above factions" (Milani, 2001: 224). And yet, because he lacked the character required for mediating between the rival factions and balancing their power, he became closer to the conservatives, with whom he shared attitudes and to whom he was indebted for support.

The first republic (1979–1989) of the Khomeinist state was essentially a "one-man show" dictated by Ayatollah Khomeini (Moslem, 2002: 143). Nonetheless, in the post-Khomeini era, the Khomeinist forces, with no charisma in politics, no war, and growing domestic opposition, were divided by disagreements over socio-political issues. The post-Khomeini state has gone through four different political periods: the second republic (1989–1997), the third republic (1997–2005), the fourth republic (2005–2013), and the fifth republic (2013–). Each republic presented a different face of Khomeinism.

The second republic (1989–1997), under President Hashemi Rafsanjani, routinized the revolutionary charisma and institutionalized the office of the *velayat-e faqih*. The neoliberal policy of reconstruction (*sazandegi*) weakened the social base of the regime,

escalated elite factionalism, and forced the regime to open up public space and allow a limited degree of socio-political liberalization. The politics of s*azandegi*, "*neo-liberal Khomeinism*", prioritized economic development over political development. The policy was far from a success because Iran in the mid-1990s was experiencing a growing socio-ideological disenchantment. Civil society managed to challenge the repressive intentions of the state. For conservatives, the harsh truth they had to accept was a growing gap between their socio-cultural values and those of the youth, the post-revolutionary generation. The state had failed to create the society Ayatollah Khomeini had envisioned. The youth were socio-culturally disenchanted, politically disappointed, and economically dissatisfied.

Religious and secular intelligentsia posed serious intellectual challenges to the ideological foundations of Khomeinism. Abdolkarim Soroush challenged authoritarian religious thinking: according to him, clerics, like other "professional groups," hold a corporate identity, "a collective identity and shared interest," and thus possess no divine authority (Brumberg, 2001: 205). The rule of the *vali-ye faqih*, Mojtahed Shabestari argued, is not divine and thus has to be subjected to democratic procedures. Ayatollah Montazeri suggested that *velayat-e faqih* "does not mean that the Leader is free to do whatever he wants without accountability" (Brumberg, 2001: 215). The *vali-ye faqih* "we envisaged in the constitution has his duties and responsibilities clearly defined. His main responsibility is to supervise." For Mohsen Kadivar, the "central question that the clergy faces today is whether it can preserve its independence. . . in the face of an Islamic state, since it does not want to fall victim to the fate of the Marxist parties of the former communist states" (Brumberg, 2001: 238). He boldly argued that such a political version of the *velayat-e faqih* existed neither in the Qur'ān, nor in the Prophet's nor the Shiite Imam's traditions (Kadivar, 1998).

By the late 1990s, the intensity of Iran's factional politics was a fact, providing much opportunity for the unexpected victory of the reformist presidential candidate Mohammad Khatami, on 23 May 1997. Khatami became the candidate for change, and received the people's protest vote, making him a "Cinderella candidate" (Milani, 2001: 29) and eventually an "accidental president" (Bakhash, 2003: 119) of the Islamic Republic. The reformist republic stood on three intellectual pillars: Islamic constitutionalism, promoting civil society, and Islamic democracy. All three intellectual pillars were bound to the lasting legacy of Khomeinism, which created a limited and inchoate subjectivity never independent of the *vali-ye faqih*. The fall of the reformist republic (1997–2005) symbolized in part the crisis of *Khomeinism with a human face* (Mahdavi, 2008).

The 2005 presidential election marked a new era in the Khomeinist state; an era of *neo-conservative Khomeinism*, which was consolidated in the disputed June 2009 presidential elections. The President of Iran's fourth republic (2005–2013), under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was a product of the state-security apparatus, the office of the *velayat-e faqih*, and Iran's neo-conservatives, a group of young members of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps whose acculturation was in the post-Iran–Iraq war period. They attempted to revive the social base of the regime among the urban and rural poor, which had been eroded in the post-Khomeini era. The president of the fourth republic spoke about distributive social justice, promised to fight Iran's new class of mafia-like rentiers, the clerical noble-sons (*aghazadeh-ha*),[7] and assured the poor that he would bring the "oil money to their table." The irony is that neo-conservative Khomeinists were dependent

on the state's rents and the shadow-economy, run by the revolutionary foundations controlled by the office of the *velayat-e faqih*.[8] Their populist slogans were instrumental in serving their pragmatist purpose, i.e. to replace the old oligarchy with a new one and to establish a populist, centralized state backed by the lower classes and sponsored by petro-dollars.

It is widely believed that with the rise of Iran's neo-conservatives to power, the Islamic Republic's social base might shift from the coalition of the *mullahs* and merchants to one of the revolutionary security and military forces. For the first time, a Khomeinist (ex-)military man and not a Khomeinist *mullah* was the president of the Republic. The conservatives, in spite of their internal conflicts, gained complete control of the Republic, and the absolute rule of the *vali-ye faqih* Khamenei seemed at hand. However, for the first time in the Islamic Republic, the public and the reformist elites have openly challenged the authority and legitimacy of the *vali-ye faqih* in the popular democratic Green Movement.

In the presidential elections on 14 June 2013, Hassan Rohani was elected as the seventh president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His four-year term, which started on 3 August 2013, brought to an end Iran's fourth republic (Ahmadinejad's presidency) and began Iran's fifth republic (2013–).

II. Ali Shariati: A Master Synthesizer, a Three-dimensional Man?

Ali Shariati (1933–1977), born into a religious family, received his doctorate in 1963 from the Sorbonne's Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, and died in London in 1977. He is widely regarded as the Voltaire of the 1979 revolution. His popularity came to exceed that of almost all other religious and secular intellectuals in pre-revolutionary Iran. And yet, Shariati was ''ignored by the secularists, admonished by the clerics, and punished by the Shah's regime. . . . The first camp considered him peripheral, the second treated him as an *enfant terrible*, and the third viewed him as a troublesome Islamic-Marxist who needed to be silenced'' (Boroujerdi, 1996: 105).

Shariati's discourse is debated among his passionate disciples, his relentless antagonists, and academic analysts. Was he a revolutionary secular thinker who used religious idioms to please the religious masses, or an original Muslim intellectual who developed novel critical synthetic theories suited to the Iranian context? Was he a totalitarian ideologue who rejected democracy, or a radical democrat with egalitarian leanings? Was he an anti-Western fanatic, or a modern critic of the imperialist West and hegemonic Westernization? Was he a modern theorist of the Islamic state or a critic of clericalism and organized religion? (Hunter, 2009: 50). Answers to these questions vary, depending on which aspects of his works are examined. Shariati shifted his position during different stages of his life and there are differences between the earlier Shariati and the later Shariati. Shariati's thought must be historicized and contextualized. As such, Ehsan Shariati (2008) argues that one needs to challenge the conventional reading of Shariati's Islamist revolutionary discourse on two levels. First, there is a clear distinction between Shariati's core and contingent ideas. While Shariati's contingent ideas were more relevant to the pre-revolutionary Iran, his core ideas contributed to the critique of the post-revolutionary conditions in Iran. Moreover, like other thinkers, Shariati's ideas were in the making and developed over time; he shifted his positions on a number

of issues. As such, a clear distinction must be made between the mature Shariati, especially in his post-prison period, and the young Shariati, especially before and during the Hosseinieh Ershad period.[9] The young Shariati delivered his lectures at Mashhad University and Hosseinieh Ershad in Tehran (1963–1973). After the latter's closure, he was imprisoned and later banned for life from giving public lectures (1973–1977). The terms ''young Shariati'' and ''mature Shariati'' are attributed to these periods, respectively. It is worth noting that even the ideas of the young Shariati during his time at Mashhad University and at the Ershad in Tehran were not identical. As for the mature Shariati, his new ideas were developed before and during his imprisonment after the closure of the Ershad but were clearly manifested in his post-prison writings (Mahdavi, 2011). Second, Shariati died in London in June 1977, shortly before the revolution. Whether Shariati, the ideologue of the revolution, anticipated that a revolution under the banner of religion would bring clerics to power is a question that warrants further examination. However, what is clear is that Shariati's thought developed before the 1979 revolution. The post-revolutionary context requires new thinking, and Shariati's core ideas potentially contribute to such a new thinking/context. Shariati is an unfinished project and there is much to develop in his thought (Ehsan Shariati, 1379/2000).

Shariati's Discourse: Core Ideas. In Shariati's absence, the intrinsic meaning of his ideas based on a *radical deconstruction* of Islamic thought was lost in the excitement of the revolution. One of Shariati's intrinsic/core ideas concerns the concept, nature, and function of religion, and deserves a closer examination.

   (a) Religion. Interpreting the role and function of religion in a sociological context in line with Max Weber and Emile Durkheim was one major source of separation between Shariati and the *ulama*. Weber was preoccupied ''with 'economic contributions of Protestant ethics' and Durkheim with contributions of religion 'to a sense of membership in human society''' (Yousefi, 1995: 93). In his attempt to illustrate a progressive notion of religion in contrast to a reactionary and archaic approach to it, Shariati followed the Durkheimian dichotomy of the ''state of effervescence'' and ''mechanical or organic solidarity.'' In Shariati's view, religion as a *movement* is a modern school of thought/ideology and religion as an *institution* is a collection of dogma, or *mazhab-e sonnati* (traditional religion). Shariati himself stressed these differences emphatically: ''Religion has two aspects; one is antagonistic to the other. For example, nobody has hatred against religion as much as I do and nobody has hope in religion as much I do'' (Yousefi, 1995: 73).

   Shariati succeeded in producing ''a radical layman's religion that disassociated itself from the traditional clergy and associated itself with the secular trinity of social revolution, technological innovation, and cultural self-assertion.'' He, indeed, ''produced exactly what the young intelligentsia craved'' (Abrahamian, 1982: 473). A radical and critical account of the status quo was in many ways congruent with the demands of the university students, middle class intellectuals, and the urban classes of workers and migrants. Shariati's central argument urged two interconnected and concurrent revolutions in Iran:

> A national revolution to end all forms of imperial domination and to vitalize. . . the coun-
> try's culture, heritage, and national identity; and a social revolution to end all forms of
> exploitation, eradicate poverty and capitalism, modernize the economy and most important
> of all, establish a just, dynamic, and classless society. (Abrahamian, 1988: 292)

The task of carrying forth these two revolutions, Shariati argued, is in the hands of the
Iranian *rushanfekran* (enlightened thinkers, intelligentsia), who are privileged by living
"in a society whose religious culture, Shiism, was intrinsically radical" (Shariati, 1979a:
19–20, quoted from Abrahamian, 1988: 292).

For Shariati, "social objectivity creates religious subjectivity," not the other way
around. This is how the socio-political hierarchy creates polytheism. The struggle
between monotheism (*towhid*) and polytheism (*shirk*) is a social and not a theological
struggle between two social forces in history. Polytheism is a religion of polytheistic
social formation, such as unjust, racist, and patriarchal forms of domination; it aims to
justify the status quo. Monotheism, in its socio-historical terms, is the struggle for human
emancipation; it aims at self- and social awareness (*khod agaahi*)/responsibility (Shar-
iati, 1981b: 30). "If I speak of religion," Shariati argued, "it is not the religion which
has prevailed in human history, but a religion whose prophets rose for the elimination
of *social polytheism*. I speak of a religion which is not realized yet. Thus our reliance
on religion is not a return to the past, but a continuation of history" (Shariati, 1998:
18). In *Religion against Religion* he argues that organized/institutionalized religion has
always undermined the emancipatory aspect of religion. Religion is "human aware-
ness," a "source of existential and social responsibility" against the structures of dom-
ination (Shariati, 1978, 1991: 221–223). According to this formulation, structures of
domination rest on a triangle of economic power, political oppression, and inner ideolo-
gical/cultural justification. Shariati provided a critique of the three pillars of the "trinity
of oppression": *zar – zur – tazvir* (gold – coercion – deception) or *tala – tigh – tasbih*
(gold – sword – rosary), meaning material injustice (*estesmar*); political dictatorship
(*estebdad*); and religious alienation (*estehmar*). He offers a three-dimensional ideal
type – a trinity of freedom, equality, and spirituality (*azadi*, *barabari*, and *erfan*) – in
opposition to the trinity of oppression and in recognition of both existential and social
responsibility, self- and social awareness. Each of these ideals emerged in response to
human problems. However, they soon created a new set of problems as they were
disassociated from each of the other two. Freedom without equality degenerated into
a freedom of markets, not human beings; equality without freedom undermined human
dignity; and spirituality without freedom and equality created the worst form of polity.
They all turned into regressive forces, new means of domination, and served the status
quo (Shariati, 1982: 37). The unity of three ideals would free human beings from the
bond of divine and materialistic determinism. It "frees mankind from the captivity of
heaven and earth alike and arrives at true humanism" (Shariati, 1987: 85, 90).

More specifically, the core of Shariati's discourse is about freedom and democracy
without capitalism, social justice and socialism without authoritarianism, and modern
spirituality without organized religion and clericalism. For Shariati, the existing democ-
racies offer only a minimum requirement of an ideal radical democracy. A maximalist
Shariati tends to agree with a radical democracy. Similarly, Shariati's strong egalitarian

leanings and constant critique of class inequality make him a socialist thinker; however, for him socialism is not merely a mode of production but a way of life. He is critical of state socialism, worshipping personality, party, and state; he advocates humanist social-ism. For Shariati, freedom and social justice must be complemented with modern spiri-tuality. Shariati is well aware that the shortcomings of mysticism become ''a shackle on the foot of the spiritual and material evolution of mankind'' and it ''separates man from his own humanity. It makes him into an importunate beggar, a slave of unseen forces beyond his power; it deposes him and alienates him from his own will. It is this established religion that today we are familiar with'' (Shariati, 1982: 52–53, 59–60). However, he favors modern critical *erfan* and spirituality, as it offers a critical dialogue with other religious traditions and modern concepts. It is, in fact, a post-religious spiri-tuality. According to Shariati, ''by pursuing values that do not exist in nature, [the] human being is lifted above nature and the spiritual and essential development of the species is secured. *Erfan* is thus a lantern shining within humanity'' (Shariati, 1982: 64). For Shariati, the trinity of freedom, equality, and spirituality is not a mechanical marriage of three distinct concepts. Rather, it is a dialectical approach toward self- and social emancipation; it puts together three inseparable dimensions of individual and society.

(b) State and democracy. Shariati's position on democracy and the role of intellectuals in the state and the Islamic state is most controversial. Shariati was a man of his time; his thought developed in the context of pre-revolutionary Iran. He thought that Iran still remained in the age of faith, as Europe had in the late feudal era, on the eve of the Eur-opean Renaissance. The *rushanfekran* (intellectuals/intelligentsia), Shariati argued, were the critical conscience of society and obliged to launch a ''renaissance'' and ''reforma-tion.'' As such, a young Shariati favored the concept of ''committed/guided'' democracy. In *Ummat va Imamat* (*Community and Leadership*) he advocated the idea of ''commit-ted/guided democracy,'' meaning that the *rushanfekran* are obliged to raise public con-sciousness, and guide public opinion in a transitional period after the revolution. Such a revolutionary leadership would transform the ignorant masses (*ra's*) into informed citi-zens (*ra'y*), and a procedural formal democracy into a substantial radical democracy (Shariati, 1987).

The young Shariati described *ummat* as the ideal Islamic society, characterized by commitment, dynamism and evolution. Since *ummat* is in constant motion and its innate characteristic is ''becoming'' rather than ''being,'' it requires a leadership (*Ima-mat*) to guide the *ummat* as it is threatened by stagnation and the danger of joy, which replaces betterment and perfection. Shariati argues that, as a necessary phase for the attainment of a true Islam, the *Imam* is to be neither elected by people nor appointed by other sources of power. Since the *Imam* has all the virtues of being an *Imam*, it is immaterial whether he becomes the choice of all members of society or that of only a few. Here, Shariati refers to the prophecy that the *rushanfekran* carry on their shoulders to guide their society, which is the same one as the prophets fulfilled in the past (Shariati, 1979a). Therefore, at least for a short period, a young egalitarian Shariati was skeptical of procedural democracy in the Third World; his skepticism was primar-ily based on the experience of the newly independent countries after World War II

where the ignorant and conservative masses ''would not be attracted by a progressive leadership concerned with the total transformation of society's old modes of thought, concepts and ways. If the people were to vote under such circumstances, Shariati argues that their vote would be for ignorant and conservative leaders like themselves'' (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990: 67).

Shariati's position should be examined in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Bandung in 1954, where the revolutionary leaders advocated ''committed/ guided democracy'' to stop the manipulation of public opinion in the electoral process in post-colonial new states. In the phase of transition from the old order to the new society ''the principle of democracy (was) considered to be in contradiction with the principle of revolutionary change, progress and leadership'' (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990: 67). Nonetheless, the mature Shariati changed his earlier position and explicitly rejected dictatorship of any form or of any social class (Shariati, 1979a: 257–258, 342). According to the later Shariati, the principal agents of change in history and society are the people, not political or religious elites. In the social context, he explicitly argued, the notion of God in the Qur'ān can be equated with the people: ''We can always substitute the people for God'' (Shariati, 1994: 153). As such, the theory of committed/guided democracy does not capture the core of Shariati's political theory.

Did Shariati advocate a religious state? Shariati articulated a humanist Islamic discourse in that people are the only true representative of God on earth. In *Religion against Religion* Shariati accused the clergy of monopolistic control over the interpretation of Islam in order to set up a clerical despotism (*estebdade ruhani*); in his words, it would be the worst and the most oppressive form of despotism possible in human history, the ''mother of all despotism and dictatorship.'' The religious state, he argued, is a clerical oligarchy. It is a clerical despotism. It is not accountable to people because it projects itself as God's representative on earth. The basic rights of the opposition groups, non-religious and religious other, are denied because they are God's enemy. Brutal injustice is justified in the name of God's mercy and justice (Shariati, 1987: 206). However, for Shariati, modern spirituality, not organized religion, still plays a constructive role in the public sphere.

Shariati's Discourse after Shariati: Unthought in Shariati's Thought

A new generation, disenchanted with Khomeini's Islamist ideology and unsatisfied with the neo-liberal hegemonic discourse, is again looking to Shariati. His critical stance toward tradition and modernity, clericalism and neoliberalism, shallow reformism and militant revolutionary approach, together with the admiration of *radical reform* both in religious thought and in socio-political structure, appeals to segments of the new generation in Iran. The discourse is particularly appealing to its supporters because of its *social*, not theological, approach to democratization, its *egalitarian* leanings toward socio-political change, and its emphasis on societal empowerment and sustainable change from *within*. However, there is something unthought in Shariati's thought: radical Islamism, the Islamic state, and the questions of ideal types/utopia are three significant aspects perhaps insufficiently thought through by Shariati.

(a) Radical and Revolutionary Islamism. Shariati accused the *ulama* of becoming an integral part of the ruling classes, and looking back to some mythical glorious age. In his view, the *ulama* treated "the scriptures as if they were fossilized, scholastic parchments rather than inspirations for a dynamic revolutionary world outlook" (Abrahamian, 1988: 296). It is evident from his writings that he visualized an Islam without the monopoly of the clergy on religious inspiration and interpretation. However, revolutionary Islamism in the post-revolutionary Iran is probably one of the most significant aporias in Shariati's thought. Clerical authority and organized religion (*ruhaniyyat*), Shariati argued, represented Safavid Shiism: a passive, apolitical, and distorted version of revolutionary Alavid Shiism. Clerical Islam, he argued, served as a socio-cultural base of political despotism by withdrawing religion from its public responsibilities, depoliticizing it except for legitimizing the current social order, and transforming it into individual piety and asceticism (Shariati, 1981a: 111). The solution, he thought, was an Islamic reformation. "It was precisely over the issue of clerical authority" that Shariati called for an Islamic Reformation. But an Islamic Reformation, Abrahamian argues, remained a difficult task, since the *ulama* have provided the dominant interpretation of Islam over the centuries (Abrahamian, 1989: 119–124). Moreover, Shariati underestimated the socio-organizational power of the clergy and the rise of radical Islamism in post-revolutionary Iran. He never anticipated the return and reincarnation of the same conservative clerical Islam of Safavid Shiism but masked with a revolutionary Alavid Shiism. Islamism was unthought in Shariati's thought. Hence, the post-revolutionary context probably requires rethinking about the nature and methods of Islamic reformation.

(b) Islamic State. While Shariati never explicitly supported a secular democracy, a new reading of Shariati's discourse in post-revolutionary Iran explicitly rejects the concept of an Islamic state and advocates a secular, or *urfi*, democracy. For Ehsan Shariati, for example, the state is a neutral secular entity and must remain neutral to all religions and ideologies. The state's legitimacy derives from public reason and the free collective will of the people. As such, a new reading of Ali Shariati's discourse would affirm political secularism, but remain critical of philosophical secularism, the positivist rationalism of secular modernity. Moreover, to use Mohammad Iqbal Lahouri's concept, this reading would advocate "spiritual democracy," not religious democracy (Ehsan Shariati, 2008). In the same way, Hassan Yusefi-Eshkevari (2011) argues that from a purely Islamic perspective, it may be argued that political power is an *urfi* and worldly question. He explicitly challenges two pillars of the Islamic state, namely, the "divine legitimacy of power" and "full implementation of *Sharia*." Political power including "the Prophet's rule in Medina was the result of a social contract." Neither the power of the state nor the *Sharia* is divine. An Islamic state is an *Islamist* human construction. Similarly, Reza Alijani (2011) advocates democratic secularism. He identifies two types of religiosity and two types of secularism. While the *Sharia*-based religion and radical/fundamentalist secularism are not compatible, the human-based religion and democratic secularism are compatible. Democratic secularization separates the religious and political institutions but highlights the normative value of religion in the individual, social, and political spheres.

(c) Ideal Types in Practice. Shariati's trinity of freedom (*azadi*), equality (*barabari*), and spirituality (*erfan*) is a novel contribution to the idea of an "alternative modernity," or "multiple modernities"; it masterfully problematizes the conventional discourses, but offers little clear alternative theory or a practical road map. What is the contribution of *erfan* in the public sphere, and how does this shape or inform the other two pillars, *azadi* and *barabari*? How does such a critical constructive *erfan* translate into a workable progressive socio-political project? More specifically, the question is whether and how the "trinity theory" translates into a workable synthetic political model of *spiritual social democracy*.

III. One Bed and Two Dreams: Two Discourses, Three Distinctions

Ayatollah Khomeini's and Ali Shariati's discourses are both radical and Islamic. Both discourses re-invented the Islamic tradition/identity under threat from the Shah's autocratic modernism. Both of them advance public religion in the service of socio-political change. Finally, in both discourses the state is not simply a neutral agent for the implementation of the majority's votes, but rather an agent of change with prior commitments to a set of principles/objectives. However, these discourses differ radically on the three concepts of radicalism, public religion, and state.

(a) Radicalism. Khomeini's discourse is ultimately a radical effort to revive clerical Islam through a traditional theological interpretation of Islam and its re-articulation in the public sphere. It is an effort to revive the status of the clerical class, which had been slowly eroded in the modern era. Ayatollah Khomeini's *radical* interpretation of the theory of *velayat-e faqih* produced no less than an *oligarchic* discourse to serve the guardianship (*velayat*) of the Islamic jurist (*faqih*). The *radical* trait of this discourse, then, is its new reading of the old and apolitical concept of *velayat-e faqih* from the vantage point of theological or clerical Islam. In doing so, the discourse presents *velayat-e faqih* as the singular legitimate form of governance.

   The *radical* character of Shariati's discourse, on the other hand, is manifested in the *deconstruction* of religion and the restructuring of its essence in the form of religious reform. Distinguishing between "calendar time" and "cultural time" Shariati argued that the Iranian society of the 1960s and 1970s had yet to reach the cultural content of the 20th century, or even that of the age of the Industrial Revolution. Instead, its cultural time corresponded more or less to that of the early Renaissance period. As such, the responsibility of Iranian intellectuals was described as being similar to that carried out by the likes of Luther and Calvin in the history of the West. Moreover, Shariati argued that contrary to Europe in the Middle Ages, in the Iran of the 1960s and 1970s the clerical class was still regarded as a major source of authority among the urban bourgeoisie as well as the urban and rural masses. He then concluded that what was needed was a deep transformation in the prevailing religious thought and a revolution in traditions in order to change their content and preserve their revised forms. This is the approach that Shariati advanced in his encounter with what he saw as an outmoded tradition, a stagnant culture, and yet a deeply rooted religion. In his view, this approach had the capacity to

achieve the revolutionary *objectives* of emancipating the masses without necessarily having the negative consequences of utilizing revolutionary *means*.

Shariati constantly quoted Georges Gurvitch in saying that instead of "society" we must speak of "societies." Shariati believed in the possibility of creating different and unique experiences that would correspond to the particular conditions of each society. The western experience of religious reform, he argued, was not to be seen as a necessary and predetermined outcome for Iran's present or future. In this view, the future is but a synthesis of the present and the past. With a new interpretation, the past can be employed to serve our present and our future. This means a *renewal* in the present, rather than a *return* to the past. Deconstruction of religion is a radical critique of the past and the present. It is a radical effort (*ijtihad*) towards freeing society from the dominance of traditional Islam.

(b) Public Religion. Both discourses advocate public religion. Khomeini's discourse is primarily geared towards preserving or reviving the interest of the clerical class, while Shariati's is a project for reviving a national identity. On the basis of a radical reading of the concept of *velayat-e faqih*, Khomeini's discourse rejects any separation of religion from the state. *Sharia* is regarded as a sacred transcendental, and thus, it is to be implemented in the public and private spheres. However, Khomeini as the absolute *vali-ye faqih* came to the view that the Islamic state ruled by the *vali-ye faqih* is empowered to unilaterally revoke *sharia* when it is contrary to the interests of the state. Reason of state is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions.

Shariati's discourse radically differs from Khomeini's discourse in its understanding of public religion. In his *Deserta* (*Kaviriyat*), Shariati explicitly rejects the divinity of *sharia* (Shariati, 1987). He believes in religious pluralism and never seeks any monopoly for religious truth. In these writings, Shariati readily engages with and speaks in the language of other religions. Not only does he adopt the spiritual language of other Semitic religions and Eastern traditions, he also identifies with non-religious personalities whom he sees as having had ethical and spiritual preoccupations.

In Khomeini's view, the public sphere is the exclusive domain of the faithful. For Shariati, on the other hand, religion in the public sphere is a basis for identity and a general direction for social change. Religion in the private sphere is a personal/spiritual experience beyond the boundaries of *sharia*.

The two discourses also differ in the ways in which they understand the public sphere and the role that religion plays in it. In Khomeini's view, the *vali-ye faqih* is the uncontested source of authority within the society and the state (the public sphere). The interests of the Islamic state ruled by the *vali-ye faqih* supersede the interests of individual and society. The *vali-ye faqih* is even empowered to revoke *sharia*, meaning the subjection of Islamic ruling to the interests of the Islamist ruler. Shariati and new readings of Shariati's discourse, on the other hand, distinguish between two different realms within the public sphere: in the social realm religion can play an active role in the formation of unions and professional associations, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, political parties, and different social–political movements. In the realm of the state, on the other hand, any official–legal intervention of religion is to be avoided. Shariati warns

that by making truth claims justified by religion, the religious state can conceal its tyranny behind a rhetoric of guiding and reforming the masses.

It may be argued that in Shariati's synthetic trinity, spirituality (*erfan*) has a pre-eminent status in giving meaning to both equality (*barabari*) and freedom (*azadi*). Equality, in his view, is not simply a just system of production and distribution, but also a philosophy that guides everyday actions and contains an *ethical* dimension. Emphasis on equality is not simply a class-based critique of capitalism. It also has important philosophical, ethical/moral implications, which can inform our engagement not only with the question of exploitation, but also with the issue of human dignity.

Similarly, spirituality can play a critical role in determining the nature of freedom and democracy. This is what Iqbal refers to as a "spiritual democracy." Once again, this is not a mechanical amalgamation of liberal democracy and spirituality, but rather a conception of democracy informed by a *spiritual ontology*. Therefore, the role of religion at the state level is not – and cannot be – an official, legal, and institutional one. Religion can, however, play a constructive role in advancing a spiritual (and yet socially committed) perspective in politics. Any effort to make a particular interpretation of religion (be it modern or traditional) into the established, official, and institutional interpretation is contrary to the trinity of freedom, equality, and spirituality. The role of religion at the state level, then, is indirect and unofficial, and its presence is accepted only to the extent that it serves the objectives of the three aforementioned ideals.

(c) State and Democracy. The role of public religion in both discourses is often regarded as an indication of elitism and social engineering. Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih* emphasizes the exclusive right of the clerical establishment to interpret religious truth and rule over the masses. Despite its populist rhetoric, Khomeini's elitist discourse essentially denies the ability of the masses to distinguish between right and wrong. It is, therefore, the religious elites (*ulama*) who must take the responsibility of social engineering. Khomeinism utilizes democratic mechanisms including elections as a device of mobilization and a means to advance its political objectives.

Shariati's discourse, and particularly his ideas of "committed/guided democracy" and *Ummat va Imamate*, are often seen as being essentially the same as Khomeini's elitism. However, as discussed before, a new reading of Shariati's works challenges this assumption. The theory of "committed/guided democracy" initially emerged out of the 1955 Bandung Conference. It was primarily a response to the challenges of consolidation of democracy in newly independent countries, and what was perceived as the absence of the necessary social conditions for the actualization of a genuine democracy. It was argued at the time that the implementation of democracy was made difficult due to the absence of an informed, independent, and meaningful public opinion. Shariati's views at the time reflected similar sentiments, and he argued that the people's vote could always remain captive to the influence of economic, political and religious/clerical power centers. It was in this context, then, that Shariati proposed his account of a "committed democracy." He argued for the necessity of a transitional period, particularly in societies that suffer from the malaise of outmoded traditions, unjust and corrupt social relations, ignorance, and external influences that reinforce such conditions. The rule of one man, or dictatorship, the young Shariati argued, would be undesirable because it would be

fascistic; the rule of the clergy, or theocracy, would be unacceptable since the *ruhani* (clergy) had been an integral part of the oppressive ruling class; and the rule of the masses, or procedural/formal democracy, would be undesirable since the general public in the Third World was so tied to traditional superstitions that it would elect conservative self-servers rather than progressive intellectuals (Abrahamian, 1989: 114).

In his later works, however, the mature Shariati questioned the validity of such mechanisms, and distanced himself from his initial theory. Perhaps, this was due to his subsequent assessment of the record of the *existing* guided democracies in post-colonial societies. In his later years, Shariati had reached the conclusion that the idea of a transitional period and the guidance of the masses by the intellectuals was futile and that *only people can liberate themselves*. It was during this period that he spoke of intellectual responsibility in terms of a prophetic mission, rather than political leadership. Shariati explicitly cautioned against the rise of a new dictatorship with the rhetoric of reforming the masses. He emphasized that the people are the singular source for giving legitimacy to political power and rejected the dictatorship of the enlightened intellectuals.

Nevertheless, Shariati's discourse can still be interpreted as advocating some notion of a committed democracy. In this reading, *commitment* places emphasis on the conditions and principles that have been identified as the necessary prerequisites for democracy in many accounts of democratic theory. According to these accounts, the substance of democracy cannot be reduced simply to the majority vote. To avoid the problem of the tyranny of the majority or the market a democratic system must be committed to protecting all the basic social, economic, political and cultural rights of all citizens (both minorities and the majority). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights can serve as a minimum set of conditions for a committed democracy. It commits the majority's vote to the universal principles of human rights so that fundamentalism, fascism, and vulgar capitalism do not take charge of human destiny in the name of implementing the views of the majority (Sara Shariati, 2008).

It may be argued, then, that the two discourses advance two radically different views of polity. Khomeinism exploits democratic procedures as a means to consolidate an elitist and oligarchic polity; democratic forms become a mechanism for the institutionalization of elite rule. New readings of Shariati's discourse, however, seek to commit democracy to a set of conditions and principles to preserve the substance of democracy. While Khomeinism has an instrumental approach to democracy, Shariati's discourse seeks to advance a critical engagement with radical democracy. The former is primarily concerned with elite rule, while the latter seeks to commit democracy to human rights and pushes for a radical, egalitarian, substantive democracy.

Conclusion: Towards Post-Islamism?

Khomeinism and Shariati's discourse developed as two distinct Islamic revolutionary discourses. There is a doctrinal antipathy between these two revolutionary discourses (Dabashi, 1993: 491). They have developed separately, appealed to different social forces, and will have different fates in post-revolutionary Iran. However, each discourse has contributed, in a distinctive way, to a shift from Islamism to *post-Islamism*.

Ayatollah Khomeini's life was full of contradiction. His thinking evolved over five distinct stages and his ideology was almost half a century in the making. Khomeini's transition from quietism to activism was prompted by the fear of secularism undermining the traditional role of the *ulama* in society. In the beginning, the form of state was not Khomeini's main concern as long as the *sharia* law was enforced. At the end, however, his theory of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* empowered the *vali-ye faqih* to unilaterally revoke *sharia* when it is contrary to the interests of the Islamic state.

Khomeini's most significant political legacy is the post-revolutionary Iranian regime, which can be divided into five republics. These republics are an amalgamation of the theory of *velayat-e faqih* with republican institutions. They are a mishmash of totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and (semi-)democracy, while each republic presents a distinctive face of Khomeinism. The first republic was essentially a "one-man show" dictated by Khomeini's populist and semi-totalitarian politics. The absence of Khomeini's charisma in the second republic undermined the totalitarian character of the state, pushing the regime towards a limited degree of pluralism, while the crisis of legitimacy made the political system more authoritarian. The third republic aimed at refreshing the spirit of Iran's quest for democracy. However, the republic failed because it was bound by the institutional and intellectual legacy of Khomeini. The fall of the reformist republic was the failure of *Khomeinism with a human face*. The fourth republic was a product of the state-security apparatus, the office of the *velayat-e faqih*, and the extremist faction of Iran's conservatives, or *neo-conservative Khomeinism*. The president of the fifth republic has promised to pull Iran back from the brink of negative economic growth, political repression, and international sanctions. The electorate cast their vote for his campaign slogans of "moderation" (*e'tedal*), "hope" (*omid*) and "wisdom" (*tadbir*). It remains to be seen whether he is competent to materialize these slogans.

After three decades, Khomeini's legacy, the Islamic Republic of Iran, both is and is not what he envisioned. Ayatollah Khomeini was, in fact, the first and last *vali-ye faqih* he envisioned! Many of Khomeini's supporters who accompanied him on his return to Iran are now in open revolt. After the events of June 2009, for example, Ayatollah Montazeri explicitly argued that "this regime is neither Islamic nor a republic; it is a mere dictatorship. This is no longer the rule of the qualified *faqih*; rather, it is the rule of the generals." He denounced *vali-ye faqih* Khamenei without mentioning his name (Nafisi, 2009). Three decades after its practice, Khomeini's ideology of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* is contested. The rise of the pro-democracy Green Movement suggests that Iran has gradually entered into a new era of post-Khomeinism, thanks to the crisis of an *Islamic state* and the practice of Khomeini's doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*. If Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih* was a radical departure from traditional Shi'a political thought, his political legacy has actually contributed to another paradigm shift from Islamism to *post-Islamism*.

Similarly, a new reading of Shariati's discourse explicitly rejects revolutionary Islamism and the Islamic state; it advocates secular democracy and promotes citizenship rights. The champions of this discourse are among the key opponents of Khomeini's politico-intellectual legacy; they contribute to a *post-Islamist turn* in contemporary Iran.[10] Post-Islamism advocates the participation of religion in the public sphere; religion might play a constructive role in civil society. However, it rejects the concept of

an Islamic state; the state is a *secular* entity no matter who the statesman is. The Islamic state in theory is an oxymoron; in practice it is no less than a clerical oligarchy, a Leviathan, which protects the interests of the ruling class. The post-Islamist discourse symbolizes a critical negotiation between tradition and modernity, religion and reason, faith and freedom, sacred and secular, and particular and universal. It is an attempt to make modernity while it critically reinvents and reforms tradition. "The notion of tradition," as Chantal Mouffe (2005: 16) argues, "has to be distinguished from that of traditionalism." A modern vision of tradition remains in a critical dialogue with "tradition" but rejects "traditionalism." It is through articulation and de-articulation, development and deconstruction of tradition that one actively participates in the making of modernity and democracy. The goal of a critical dialogue with culture and mining the tradition is not to reclaim "traditionalism" or to claim that all universal values derive from a local culture; the goal instead is to show that values such as democracy and human rights have deep native roots in the local intellectual soil. By uncovering the native roots of such ideas, democracy, human rights, and social justice will be seen as ideas that are at once deeply local and global; they are genuinely *glocal*.

The challenge of post-Islamism is to make a clear distinction between an *alternative modernity* and an *alternative to modernity*. While the former is conducive to the development of a critical *glocal* third way, the latter, Ernesto Laclau (1996: 26, 32) argues, is no less than "self-defeating." In other words, "this is the route to self-apartheid." Nostalgic traditionalism is narcissistic retirement within oneself, which can only lead to a suicidal exile and self-marginalization.

Acknowledgment

Notes

1. The *ghayba* (occultation) of the last *Imam* had two phases: the shorter phase and the complete occultation. During the first phase (874–941) four special deputies (*nuvvab-e khaas*) were in direct contact with the Imam. After the death of the last deputy the *ulama* have claimed to be the general deputies (*nuvvab-e aam*) of the *Imam*.

2. The book's real target was "the 'renegade' clergymen who in Khomeini's eyes had 'actively collaborated with him'. Indeed, it was a direct response to an attack on the clerical establishment in a pamphlet called Asrar-e Hezar Saleh (Secrets of a Thousand Years) written by Hakamizadeh, the editor of Homayon." Hakamizadeh and his colleagues including Ahmad Kasravi were strongly disappointed with the religious establishment and its reactionary approach. See Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (1999: 60–61).

3. According to one view, for Khomeini, the *vali-ye faqih* derives his *popularity* from people but his *legitimacy* is divine. Another interpretation suggests that both the popularity and the legitimacy of the *vali-ye faqih* derive from people, not God.

4. The Society of Combatant Clergy (*Jame'eh Rouhaniyat-e Mobarez*) has supported the conservative Khomeinists. The major representatives of the Society include Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, and Ali-Akbar Nateq Nuri.

Moreover, the Allied Islamic Society (*Jamiyat-e Mo'talefeh-ye Islami*) is another major orga-
nization of this faction. Habibullah Asgarowladi, Mohammad-reza Bahonar, Assadullah
Badamchiyan, Mohamad Nabi, Hamid-reza Tarraghi, and Ali Larijani are among the major
representatives of this powerful conservative organization.

5. The Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (*Sazman-e Mojahdin-e Enghelab-e
   Islami*) has supported the revolutionary Khomeinists. The major figures of this organization
   include Behzad Nabavi, Mohammad Salamati, Saeed Hajjarian, and Mustafa Tajzadeh. The
   Society of Combatant Clerics (*Maj'ma-Rouhaniyon-e Mobarez*) is another organization of this
   faction. Ayatollah Mohammad Khoeiniha, Mehdi Karrubi, and Mohammad Khatami constitute
   the public figures of the Society. The central committee of the Islamic Republican Party, until its
   dissolution in 1986, was more inclined to the revolutionary Khomeinists and less to the conser-
   vatives. Mir-Hossein Mousavi among others was an important member of the Party. It is worth
   noting that many of the reformists in the 1990s came from the camp of the revolutionary Kho-
   meinists. They include former president Mohammed Khatami, former speaker of the *Majles* and
   the reformist candidate for the 2009 presidential election, Mehdi Karrubi, and Mir-Hossein
   Mousavi, the main candidate of the reformists in the 2009 presidential election.
6. The *vali-ye faqih* was given authority to delineate general policies and supervise the execution
   of decisions; to devise national referenda; to hold the supreme command of the armed forces;
   to declare war; to appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of the six jurists of the Guardian
   Council, the Chief Justice, the head of the national radio and television, the chief commanders
   of the Revolutionary Guard and of the armed forces. Moreover, the new Constitution replaced
   the five members of the High Court (the judiciary council) with the individual position of the
   Chief Justice appointed by the *vali-ye faqih*.
7. The "agha-zadeh" (clerical noble-born) became a common name attributed to the Ayatollahs'
   sons and close relatives, blessed by patrimonial politics and privileged by the rents received
   from formal and informal sources. The emergence of this "new class" was largely linked to
   the oil rents and development of the revolutionary and religious foundations (*Bonyads*).
8. Ahmadinejad's colleagues such as Sadeq Mahsouli, then Minister of Social Welfare, and
   Mohammad Reza Rahimi, then Vice-President, among others, are members of the new oli-
   garchy. The former is a billionaire real-estate broker and the latter is another billionaire ben-
   efiting from exclusive political rents.
9. The Hosseinieh Ershad is an Islamic institution in Northern Tehran. It was built in the 1960s
   by some modern moderate Muslims to educate the young generation. The institute includes a
   large public library and a lecture hall used for public lectures. Ali Shariati and some other
   Muslim intellectuals held their lectures in the Hosseinieh Ershad where most of the audience
   members were university students. The Pahlavi regime closed the institute in 1972 and Shar-
   iati was imprisoned and banned for life from giving any public lecture, with the ban continuing
   for the last four years of his life (1973–1977).
10. Some of the public figures of this discourse include Narges Mohammadi, a female civil acti-
    vist and deputy director and spokesperson for the Defenders of Human Rights Center; Hoda
    Saber who was beaten to death in Evin prison in 2011; Ahmad Zeidabadi, a well-known jour-
    nalist, who was charged with inciting public opinion and suffered imprisonment; Taqi Rah-
    mani, a writer and journalist, who since 1981 has spent five thousand days in prison; and
    Reza Alijani, Yusefi-Eshkevari, and Shariati's family, who are all politically and intellectually
    contributing toward a post-Islamist era in Iran.

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