

CHAPTER 12

AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI

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Government can only be legitimate when it accepts the rule of God, and the rule of God means the implementation of the *shari`ah*.

Ayatollah Khomeini

If we say that the government (*hokumat*) and guardianship (*velayat*) is today the task of the *fuqaha* (religious jurists), we do not mean that the *faqih* (jurist) should be the Shah, the minister, the soldier or even the dustman.

Ayatollah Khomeini

The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any *shari`ah* agreement that it has conducted with people when those agreements are contrary to the interests of the country or of Islam.

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INTRODUCTION

THIS essay aims to contextualize the life and legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–1989). It suggests that the politics, perspective, and personality of Ayatollah Khomeini, Khomeinism, have been central in the making of Iran's postrevolutionary state. Ayatollah Khomeini's thinking, however, was almost half a century in the making; his thinking evolved over five distinct stages, beginning with political quietism and concluding with political absolutism. The essay is divided into three parts. First, it examines Ayatollah Khomeini's first and second stages of life. While the first and second stages of his politicointellectual journey—quietism and constitutionalism—did not directly contribute to Iranian politics, they remain significant in understanding Khomeinism. In the second section, we will examine the making of Khomeinism, that is the third, fourth, and fifth stages of his politicointellectual journey—Khomeini as the radical revolutionary, the *vali-ye faqih*, and the absolute *vali-ye faqih*. In the third section, we will problematize Khomeini's controversial legacy by examining Khomeinism after Khomeini. Ayatollah Khomeini's death did not put an end to Khomeinism; his contentious legacy is still alive and dominates current Iranian politics. The

controversy over the presidential election in June 2009 captures the ambiguity and complexity of his legacy. The conclusion sheds some light on the conditions and possibility of post-Khomeinism.

I. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI: FROM QUIETISM TO CONSTITUTIONALISM

Khomeini the quietist (1920s–1940s)

Ruhollah Khomeini, born into a clerical merchant family in Khomein in southwestern Iran, achieved prominence among the students of Ayatollah Abd al Karim Haeri (d. 1936) and received the degree of *itjihad* (independent judgment in legal matters) in 1936.¹ He was only thirty-three when he became known as the *marja-e taqlid*, meaning the source of emulation. Khomeini as a *marja-e taqlid* and a teacher did not restrict himself to the conventional teachings and habits of the *madrasesh* (the seminary). By the 1940s Khomeini became a master synthesizer: in Qom's Feyziyeh Seminary he offered an unconventional curriculum, brought together the study of mysticism (*'irfan*), philosophy (*falsafeh*), ethics (*akhlāq*), and Islamic law (*shari'ah*). Not only was he practicing how to combine *irfan* and politics, but he also was insisting on reconciling two opposing schools in clerical thought: *'irfan* and *shari'ah*. Khomeini was "one of the few to have reached the stature of a leading jurispudent, the highest level of theoretical mysticism and also to have become a highly-regarded teacher of Islamic philosophy. He was unique in being at the same time a leading practitioner of militant Islam."²

The young Khomeini's attitude to politics, however, was congruent with the long established apolitical tradition of the clerical institution. Political quietism and social conservatism best represent the dominant tradition of clerical Shiism. In this tradition the clergy remained apolitical and deferred to the monarchy. According to the traditional understanding of the doctrine of the Imam, the leadership of the community rests solely with the imam. The last/twelfth imam gone into hiding/occultation (260/874) is the sole legitimate leader of the community, and it is believed he shall eventually return to establish the rule of Islam.³ In the meantime, the community of believers ruled by illegitimate authority remains apolitical. The *'ulema'* (clerics) guide the community in religious matters and are responsible for the protection of the faith. Although a few clerics were politically active after the establishment of the Safavid dynasty, the clerical establishment remained largely apolitical, meaning it never proposed an alternative polity to the ruling authorities. Political quietism in the Shiite tradition, writes Hamid Enayat, resembles the pragmatic logic of "Sunni realism," meaning that the "supreme value in politics [is] ... not justice but security—a state of mind which sets a high premium on the ability to rule and maintain 'law and order' rather than on piety."⁴

Nonetheless, because the authority of the Hidden imam is passed to the *'ulema'*, the argument goes, they exclusively understand and interpret the *shari'ah* law. This suggests that "while power might lie with the temporal body, authority would naturally devolve onto the jurists." The Qajar dynasty (1794–1925) recognized this authority, but the Pahlavi monarchs (1925–1979) did not; this eventually caused tensions in state-clergy relations under the Pahlavi dynasty.⁵

After the death of Ayatollah Haeri in 1936, Ayatollah Mohamad Hossein Buroujerdi (d. 1961) became the supreme religious authority in Iran. Khomeini remained a quietist cleric so long as Ayatollah Buroujerdi, an important religious authority and a strong advocate of clerical quietism, was alive. The young Khomeini, although frustrated by Reza Shah's secular reforms, remained quietist, relying on the Shiite practice of *taqiyyah*, or dissimulation, which permits people to deny their faith in order to continue its practice.⁶ In 1941, the Allies replaced Reza Shah due to his pro-German stance with son, Mohamad Reza, as the new shah. The young shah welcomed religious activities in order to contain the supporters of the communist Tudeh Party connected the Soviet Union. The clerical establishment welcomed the new regime's policy, as it would strengthen its clerical institutions. The young Ayatollah was not an exception; he welcomed the change and remained quietist.

Khomeini the constitutionalist (1940s–1971)

Khomeini's transition from quietism to constitutionalism was prompted by the fear of secularism undermining the traditional role of the 'ulema' in society. As a political activist Khomeini's first public statement came in a book published in 1945. The book titled *Kashf al-Asrar* (The Discovery of Secrets) was essentially a detailed, systematic critique of an anti-religious tract, but it also contained passages that were critical of the antireligious policy of the Pahlavi monarch. In this small polemical book Khomeini attacked secularism, Reza Shah's anticlerical policies, and a group of clergy who had offended the clerical establishment.⁷ The book became the first statement of Khomeini's view on both constitutionalism and the Islamic state. "Government," Khomeini argued, "can only be legitimate when it accepts the rule of God, and the rule of God means the implementation of the *shari'ah*."⁸ But Khomeini did not challenge the institution of monarchy and remained a constitutionalist. He sought a supervisory (*nezarat*) role for the 'ulema'. This was in accord with Article 2 of the 1906 Constitution, as suggested by Shaykh Fazlollah Nouri, providing for a clerical committee to supervise laws passed by the *majles* (parliament). If on rare occasions the 'ulema' criticized the regime, writes Abrahamian, "it was because they opposed specific monarchs, not the 'whole foundation of monarchy.'" Khomeini the constitutionalist was not an exception; he did not oppose the institution of monarchy.

In *Kashf al-Asrar* the form of government was not Khomeini's main concern as long as the *shari'ah* law was enforced. Khomeini described the legal procedures and the constitutional arrangement in line of his constitutionalist approach to politics. He argued that

if we say that the government (*hokumat*) and guardianship (*velayat*) is today the task of the *fuqaha* (religious jurists), we do not mean that the *faqih* (jurist) should be the Shah, the minister, the soldier or even the dustman. Rather, we mean that a *majles* that is...[run] according to European laws... is not appropriate for a state... whose laws are Holy... But if this *majles* is made up of believing *mujtahids* who know the divine laws and... if they elect a righteous sultan who will not deviate from the divine laws... or if the *majles* is under the supervision of the believing *fuqaha*, then this arrangement will not conflict with the divine law.¹⁰

Khomeini was clearly absent from politics in the years 1951–1953; he was unfriendly to the nationalist movement led by Mohammad Mosaddeq in the 1950s.¹¹ Khomeini was disappointed with the politics of quietism and was inspired by Islamist militants' idea

of Islamic universalism but remained politically inactive and never publicly criticized Ayatollah Buroujerdi's policies.¹² It appears in retrospect that he understood that he had to establish "his credentials as a prominent religious leader before moving on to the political arena in order to both strengthen his standing within the religious establishment and widen his power base in general."¹³

Khomeini's real entry into politics came in 1962–1963 after the inauguration of the shah's reforms known as the "White Revolution." Ayatollah Buroujerdi's death in 1961 opened the space for Khomeini's involvement in politics and also left the religious institution with no single successor. Given the presence of older ayatollahs, Khomeini was a junior candidate for Buroujerdi's position. However, he seized the moment and published a collection of rulings on matters of religious practice (*resaley-e tozihol masael*), and with this book he made himself available to be recognized as the *marja-e taghlid*. The shah regime's difficulties with the White Revolution gave him the opportunity to emerge as a leading clerical opponent. Khomeini attacked the new electoral law enfranchising women as an un-Islamic law and the referendum endorsing the White Revolution as an *unconstitutional* procedure.¹⁴ In response the shah sent paratroopers to attack Feyziyeh Madreseh, the religious seminary where Khomeini taught. The school was ransacked, Khomeini himself was arrested, and some students died. For Khomeini, this event showed the regime's hostility toward Islam and the clerical establishment. Khomeini was released from prison in 1964 and soon denounced the shah's tyrannical regime as being subordinate to US interests in Iran. When legal immunity was granted by the shah to American personnel for offences committed on Iranian territory, Khomeini furiously condemned this policy as humiliating to Muslims in their own country. In his words, "If someone runs over a dog belonging to an American, he will be prosecuted. . . . But if an American cook runs over the shah, the head of the state, no one will have the right to interfere with him. Why? Because they wanted a loan and America demanded this in return."¹⁵ Khomeini was again arrested in 1964 and sent into exile in Turkey and then to Najaf, Iraq's most important Shiite shrine city. While in exile Khomeini "established himself as a major presence in Najaf."¹⁶ Despite his physical absence from Iran, he maintained his influence among some Muslim political organizations inside Iran.

In *Kashf al-Asrar* Khomeini had argued in 1945 that the clergy should provide legal and moral guidance and not become politically involved. In return, the clergy expected respect for the *shari'ah* and the clerical establishment. Khomeini's view as a constitutionalist remained unchanged until the 1970s despite the events of 1963.

II. THE MAKING OF KHOMEINISM: THE TRIUMPH OF A REVOLUTIONARY AYATOLLAH

Although prerevolutionary Iran never experienced a homogeneous Islamist political culture, Khomeinism dominated revolutionary Iran. Khomeinism was built upon a political and pragmatic reinterpretation of religious scripture that evolved into revolutionary populism.¹⁷ Khomeinism is neither traditionalism nor fundamentalism; it symbolizes neither a premodern movement nor a postmodern phenomenon. It is not traditionalism, since Ayatollah Khomeini departed radically from the Shiite tradition of political quietism in the face of sociopolitical injustice. It is not fundamentalism, as the term

“fundamentalism” derived from American Protestantism and implies the literal interpretation of scriptural texts.

Similarly, in spite of its critique of modernity, Khomeinism is not a postmodern phenomenon. Khomeinism explicitly associated itself with intellectual absolutism, insisting on the absolute representation of the Truth. Central to Khomeinism is its antihermeneutic claim, insisting that the *core* meaning of the Qur'an is absolutely clear and not open to interpretation. Postmodernity is largely antifoundational, while like other versions of Islamism, Khomeinism insists on some absolute a priori foundation as the basis of its ideology. Finally, it makes little sense to characterize Khomeinism as antimodern or even premodern, given its profound engagement with the modern world such as its ability to equip itself with modern technologies of organization, surveillance, warfare, and propaganda. Khomeinism refashioned and institutionalized a modern theocracy: the “whole constitutional structure of the Islamic Republic was modeled less on the early caliphate than on de Gaulle's Fifth Republic.”¹⁸ Ayatollah Khomeini's ideologized account of the tradition offered the country hope of relief from the ill effects of absolutism and imperialism and led to the formation of a nationwide populist revolutionary coalition. His political critique of the shah's absolutism and Western imperialism was more renowned than his theory of the *velayat-e faqih* (guardianship of jurist).

Khomeini the revolutionary (1971–1979)

In the early 1970s, “Khomeini was the first Shiite jurist to open the discussion (*fath-e bab*) of ‘Islamic government’ in a work of jurisprudence.”¹⁹ The theory of Islamic government was a departure point from constitutionalism. Khomeini began to change his position by suggesting that the whole institution of monarchy was illegitimate and that Muslims should be ruled by an Islamic government. He stated, “The Islamic government is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are bound by a collection of conditions defined by the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet. . . . In this system of government sovereignty originates in God, and law is the word of God.”²⁰ He developed, through a series of lectures delivered in Najaf in the early 1970s, the novel idea that a just, knowledgeable, and faithful *faqih*, in the absence of the twelfth Shiite imam, was obliged to exercise both religious and political power. “The ruler,” Khomeini argued “must have two characteristics: knowledge of the law and justice. He must have knowledge of the law because Islamic government is the rule of law and not the arbitrary rule of persons. In this sense only the *faqih* can be the righteous ruler.”²¹

Khomeini's theory of the *velayat-e faqih* was a radical departure from the dominant traditional trends in Shiism.²² The theory challenged the conventional Shiite doctrine of *Imamat*, which states that the legitimate leadership of the Muslim community belongs to the Prophet and his twelve successors or imams. Khomeini proposed the novel idea that “our duty to preserve Islam” by establishing an Islamic government “is one of the most important obligations incumbent upon us; it is more necessary even than prayer and fasting.”²³ He suggested the task of creating an Islamic government that can be justified on the basis of the “secondary ordinances” (*ahkam-e sanaviye*), where the “primary ordinances” that is the *shari'ah* laws are silent or not explicit.²⁴

Ayatollah Khomeini established his doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* on two traditional and rational grounds.²⁵ The government is an essential component of Islam because the Prophet

created an Islamic state. Moreover, the *shari'ah* law cannot be fully implemented without an Islamic state; Islamic government is the only legitimate tool to put the Islamic rules into practice. Muslims cannot live under un-Islamic rule, and the implementation of *shari'ah* law cannot be stopped during the Great Occultation: "Did God limit the validity of His laws to two hundred years? Was everything pertaining to Islam meant to be abandoned after the Lesser Occultation?"²⁶ The just *vali-ye faqih* is the only qualified ruler to undertake this task after the Prophet and the imams.

Khomeini initially stated, "Whatever is in [constitutional] accord with the law of Islam we shall accept and whatever is opposed to Islam, even if it is the constitution, we shall oppose."²⁷ He then increasingly came to believe that Islam was under greater threat from colonialism, "and thus shifted his emphasis from the constitution to Islam."²⁸ He argued that the Pahlavi regime was bent on destroying Islam because only Islam and the '*ulema*' can prevent the onslaught of colonialism.²⁹ Khomeini eventually rejected constitutionalism and monarchy: "Islam is fundamentally opposed to the whole notion of monarchy," he argued, because it is one of the most shameful "reactionary manifestations."³⁰

Why and how did the constitutionalist Khomeini become a revolutionary? Why did it happen in the 1970s? Ayatollah Khomeini remained in close contact with Iran during his exile years and was deeply influenced by the waves of new ideas and radical trends in Iran. He, for example, read Al-e Ahmad's (1923–1969) pamphlet, *Gharbzadegi* (Westoxification), given his frequent use of the term in the late 1970s.³¹ Moreover, Iranians outside the country also played a part in transforming Khomeini's views. In November 1973, Khomeini urged the Iranians to rise against the aggression of the Zionist regime while the shah was considered a friend of Israel. He attacked the shah for creating the Rastakhiz Party and opposed replacing Iran's Islamic calendar with that of the Achaemenid, known as the *Shahanshahi* calendar. He also condemned the shah's celebration of the 2,500-year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy, given the painful reality of Iranian society. By the 1970s, Khomeini was transformed into a populist and revolutionary Ayatollah with an ability to communicate with different groups of people.

The sociopolitical events of the late 1970s pushed Khomeini to become the leader of "the unthinkable revolution."³² "Acting under another of its erroneous assumptions," the shah's regime requested that the Iraqi government expel Khomeini "in the hope of depriving him of his base of operations and robbing the Revolution of its leadership."³³ Khomeini went to France, which proved beneficial, as communication with Iran was easier from France because Khomeini's declarations were telephoned directly to Iran. His popular speech was articulated in the popular idioms and therefore united Iran's urban middle class and lower class under his charismatic leadership.

The shah was ultimately forced to leave Iran for the last time on January 16, 1979 and within two weeks Khomeini returned to Iran. On February 1 Khomeini received a tumultuous welcome in Tehran. Within ten days the old regime collapsed, and Khomeini established a new regime called the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini spent the last two parts of his life under a polity he created. He successfully transformed the last monarchy into Iran's first republic. However, the republic he founded transformed Khomeini the revolutionary into Khomeini the *vali-ye faqih* (1979–1987) and eventually Khomeini the absolute *vali-ye faqih* (1987–1989).

Khomeini the *vali-ye faqih* (1979–1987)

In the absence of a common enemy, social and political differences in the aftermath of the revolution became more visible. There was division among the Islamists, nationalists of secular thinking, and various groups on the secular left. Each group held different opinions on the future of postrevolutionary politics. For Khomeini, the leader of the revolution, the future could only be an Islamic republic, but its nature remained undefined. Khomeini wanted to place the theory of *velayat-e faqih* as the leading idea of the revolution, merging clericalism and republicanism. Hence, both concepts were redefined. First, the Shiite “jurist law” was “transformed into the law of the state.”³⁴ In his theory of *velayat-e faqih*, Khomeini redefined the role of clergy, suggesting that “in Islam there is no distinction between temporal and religious power. He rejected the prevalent notion that the jurists’ task should be limited to understanding and interpreting the *shari’ah*. They are not mere collectors of traditions; rather it is also part of their duty to implement the law.”³⁵ In fact, the role of the imam, he suggested, “should be represented by a *faqih*, as the sole holder of legitimate authority.”³⁶ In other words, Khomeini’s definition of politics was an individual’s conformity to the *shari’ah*. For Khomeini, the structure of authority was divine and the state was instrumental in the implementation of the *shari’ah*. Second, Khomeini also redefined the concept of republicanism in accordance with clerical rule. The people’s participation in politics, or republicanism, resembled for Khomeini the traditional Islamic concept of *bay’a*, meaning the vote of allegiance to authority.³⁷

Ayatollah “Khomeini was not setting up government in a vacuum but was taking over an existing one which had undergone considerable modernization in the course of the twentieth century.”³⁸ To incorporate the theory of the *velayat-e faqih* into state institutions required time and experience. In appointing Mehdi Bazargan, a liberal Muslim, to head the interim government Khomeini was seeking time and experience for the clergy to eventually lead the new regime and consolidate Khomeinism.³⁹ In Paris Khomeini said “the ‘*ulema*’ themselves will not hold power in the government” but instead “exercise supervision over those who govern and give them guidance.”⁴⁰ But by the end of 1979, Iran had a quasitheocratic constitution, and by the summer of 1981 Khomeini’s theory was in practice.⁴¹ Ayatollah “Khomeini’s personal role in the gradual transformation of the clergy into a ‘clerical regency’—as Bazargan using the French term, called the new theocracy—was significant.”⁴² Khomeini as the *vali-ye faqih* wanted the clergy in the office of the president: the first clerical president and the Islamic Republic’s third president was Ali Khamenei, then secretary general of the Islamic Republican Party and the future successor of Ayatollah Khomeini.

“Yet the results,” as Brumberg put it, “were far from the theocracy that Ayatollah Khomeini had zealously proclaimed. Instead of producing a coherent constitutional map, the clerics blended several different ones, thus institutionalizing a new political order based on contending visions of authority,” ranging from orthodox to pragmatist to democratic visions.⁴³ Khomeini’s traditional and charismatic authorities were institutionalized in the constitution. The office of the *velayat-e faqih* and Khomeini as the *vali-ye faqih* brought together traditional, charismatic, and legal authorities in the making of the Islamic Republic. This was a “dissonant institutionalization,”⁴⁴ which caused many contradictions in the state of Khomeinism and much tension in the Khomeinist state.

The Iran-Iraq war provided Ayatollah Khomeini with a historic opportunity to consolidate his vision of the revolution. The unintended consequences of the eight-year war, the

longest war in post-World War II,⁴⁵ were to change the state-society relationships and contribute to the reenchantment of the Iranian society. "If Iranians had entered the war as obedient subjects, they emerged from it with a keener sense of their own relationship to the state."⁴⁶ The legacy of the war was contradictory: it ironically strengthened both the state and the society, which both emerged with their self-confidence enhanced. To use Charles Tilly words, the war was instrumental in "state making," meaning "eliminating and neutralizing" the state's internal political rivals and enemies.⁴⁷ And yet the war changed relations between the state and society, as it simultaneously created a mass society with its demands unfulfilled. More importantly, the Khomeinist state was facing a growing tension between conservative elites or traditional right and revolutionary elites. By 1987, it became "too clear that the regime's emphasis on Islam, war, revolutionary discourse, and the persona of Khomeini were insufficient for governing Iran."⁴⁸ The crisis in the economy, the frustration and alienation in society, and the systematic deadlock and ideological factionalism in politics alarmed the regime, pushing the state to take some initiatives for change. "Perhaps more than anyone it was Khomeini who had woken up to this reality: the engine for change was Khomeini himself."⁴⁹ The change was aimed at the consolidation of the Islamic Republic. The institutionalization of the *velayat-e faqih* and rationalization of power, however, did not contribute to democratization but instead enhanced the power of the *vali-ye faqih* and made Khomeini more or less into an absolute (*motlaqeh*) *vali-ye faqih*.

Khomeini the absolute *vali-ye faqih* (1987–1989)

Three significant issues exemplified the transformation of Ayatollah Khomeini into the absolute *vali-ye faqih*. In all three issues, Khomeini was concerned about the future of the state he created.

The absolute rule of the state over religion

The elimination of so-called enemies of the *velayat-e faqih* brought to the fore divisions within the Khomeinist camp. These revolved "around the soul of the state," that is, "the characteristics of the government of *velayat-e faqih*" and "its Islamicity."⁵⁰ The first faction, the conservative or traditional right, backed by the *bazaari* merchants and the orthodox clergy, held a conservative position on the nature of the Islamic state and "wanted strict implementation of *shari`ah* in the socio-cultural spheres."⁵¹ The second faction, the revolutionary elites, by contrast "supported state-sponsored redistributive and egalitarian policies."⁵² They also believed that primary Islamic ordinances (*ahkam-e awaliye*), derived from two Islamic sources of the Qur'an and the Tradition of the Prophet (the *Sunna*) were insufficient, and therefore Muslims living in modern times needed to issue secondary ordinances (*ahkam-e sanaviyeh*).⁵³ Ayatollah Khomeini trusted both factions. He appointed the six jurist members of the Guardian Council, the legislative body with veto power over the *majles'* bills, from the conservatives. At the same time he strongly supported the statist-revolutionary bills in the *majles* and the revolutionary plans provided by then Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Musavi (1980–1989). In the struggle between the two Khomeinist camps, "Khomeini shrewdly pursued his unique policy of 'dual containment.'"⁵⁴

Khomeini's charisma was the backbone of his policy of "two-handed way," hiding the constitutional contradictions in the institutional setting of the Islamic Republic. By 1987, however, Khomeini's policy of "dual containment" was no longer effective, given the ever-increasing disagreements over economic, sociocultural, and military policies between the two factions. From December 1987 until his death in June 1989, Khomeini issued various decrees to clarify his sociopolitical positions and sided with the revolutionary camp.⁵⁵

In December 1987, after continuous tensions between the conservative Guardian Council and the revolutionary *majles* over the tax bill and the labor law, Khomeini intervened and authorized the government to introduce bills essential to the interests of the state. In his speech he insisted, "The state can by using this power, replace those fundamental . . . Islamic systems, by any kind of social, economic, labor . . . commercial, urban affairs, agricultural, or other system, and can make the services . . . that are the monopoly of the state . . . into an instrument for the implementation of general and comprehensive politics."⁵⁶ When then President Ali Khamenei interpreted Khomeini's argument, suggesting that "the executive branch . . . should have a permanent presence in society . . . within the limits of Islamic laws and Islamic principles,"⁵⁷ Khomeini harshly responded by blaming Khamenei for misrepresenting his argument and his ruling. In January 1988 he made it clear that

The state that is a part of the absolute vice-regency of the Prophet of God is one of the primary injunctions of Islam and has priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting and *haj*. . . The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any *sharia* agreement that it has conducted with people when those agreements are contrary to the interests of the country or of Islam.⁵⁸

Khomeini as the absolute *vali-ye faqih* came to the view that all aspects of Islam were subordinate to the interests of the Islamic state. "From now on religion would serve the Islamic state rather than vice versa."⁵⁹ For Khomeini, as Brumberg put it, "the *faqih* was not merely the interpreter of the law, but in some sense the *vehicle* of law itself."⁶⁰ Khomeini, indeed, "implied that the vice regent of God had the authority to *create* both divine and secondary injunctions."⁶¹ Even though "Khomeini in theory granted new and unparalleled powers to the *faqih*, he at the same time drastically undermined the religiousness of the regime and bolstered its populist-republican dimension."⁶² Khomeini provided the state "with the authority not only to intervene in the economy but the right to use its discretion to suspend even the pillars of Islam."⁶³

Ayatollah Khomeini's statement was bold but certainly not new. "Khomeini had long believed in the utilitarian tasks of government and had used the term *interests* in the context as far back as 1941."⁶⁴ This time, however, he clearly "broke from the historical position of the religious establishment in Iran with regard to state ordinances."⁶⁵ The statement was extremely significant, because "Khomeini emerged as a primary routinizer of his own charisma."⁶⁶ Khomeini as the absolute *vali-ye faqih* "by design or default" lay the foundation for greater tensions over his legacy and, indeed, over "the very nature and role of the state." The revolutionary Khomeinists sought to institutionalize "Khomeini's charisma in the *majlis* and government," while the conservative Khomeinists "tried to rescue the idea of charismatic rule by defending the investment of all authority in the *person* of the *faqih*."⁶⁷ Khomeini's exceptional statement in 1988, in sum, seemed to point toward an institutionalization of the absolute *velayat-e faqih*—a pragmatic rationalization, if not secularization, of the political order and the subjection of Islamic rulings to the interests of the Islamist rulers.

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The "poisonous chalice" of the peace

After accepting the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war, reported Khomeini's son, "he could no longer walk. . . . He never again spoke in public. . . . and he fell ill and was taken to the hospital."⁶⁸ By 1988 Khomeini realized the war was no longer in the interests of the state and was undermining the very survival of the republic. Despite his fiery talks against imperialism and the infidel enemy, as the founding father of the republic Khomeini had no choice but, to use his own phrase, to drink from "the poisonous chalice" and save the state: "How unhappy I am because I have survived and have drunk the poisonous chalice of accepting the resolution. . . . At this juncture I regard it to be in the interest of the revolution and of the system."⁶⁹

Ayatollah Khomeini accepted the ceasefire in the summer of 1988 and died in the summer of 1989. During this period Khomeini expressed his "absolute" authority in three specific events. First, following the end of the war, the People's Mojahedin Organization, the opposition group based in Iraq, launched a military attack against Iran. The regime response was harsh: the Mojahedin's forces were massacred on the battlefronts and several thousand jailed political opponents were executed in the prisons.⁷⁰ Second, Khomeini's *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie's novel *Satanic Verses* created much tension between Iran and the West. Third, after a decision by the Assembly of the Experts in 1985 it was expected that Khomeini's loyal student, Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, would succeed him. Montazeri was the only high-ranking cleric who supported Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih* and contributed in theory and practice to the institutionalization of the *velayat-e faqih*. However, Montazeri frequently criticized the violation of human rights by the regime. He challenged the regime's new reign of terror in the summer and autumn of 1988. Disappointed with Montazeri's reactions, Khomeini asked him to resign and ordered the Assembly of the Experts to meet and make a decision on the future leadership of the republic. The purge of the only Ayatollah loyal to the doctrine of the *velayat-e faqih* set the stage for the revision and the redefinition of Khomeini's doctrine of the *velayat-e faqih*.

The succession: the rationalization of the velayat-e faqih?

There was one last work for Ayatollah Khomeini to fulfill before he died in June 1989: his succession. With Montazeri's dismissal, Khomeini needed to find a successor. The 1979 constitution was explicit in the theological qualifications of the *vali-ye faqih*, indicating in addition to all personal and political qualifications, only one among the grand ayatollahs as the prominent *marji'a*, or the source of imitation, could hold the office. The problem was that none among the grand ayatollahs was sympathetic to Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih*. Moreover, the leading grand ayatollahs lacked the personal charisma or high political qualifications required for the office. However, there were a number of middle-ranking clerics who accepted Khomeini's theory and held the necessary political requirements. The pragmatic solution was to revise the constitution to save the Khomeinist state.

The 1989 constitution was a departure from the 1979 constitution. It expanded the power of the *faqih* by transferring the president's task of coordinating the three branches of government to the office of the *velayat-e faqih*. It made it explicit that the *vali-ye faqih* holds "absolute" power by adding the phrase *motlaqeh* to Articles 107–110, defining his absolute authority. The 1989 constitution, under Article 110, listed the expanded authority of the *vali-ye faqih*.⁷¹ More importantly, Article 109 of the amended constitution separated

the position of the *marji`a* from that of the *faqih*, setting the stage for the selection of a new *vali-ye faqih* who could be a middle-ranking cleric. As specified in Article 109, the *vali-ye faqih* no longer needed to hold the religious qualification of the *marja`e taqlid*, or source of religious emulation. Khomeini's theory of the *velayat-e faqih* "received a blow, as it effectively, in the long run, separated the position of the 'leader' from the institution of *marja'iyat*, subordinating the latter to the state."⁷²

Paradoxically, Khomeini's priority respecting the interests of the state led him to revive his own theory of the *velayat-e faqih* by reducing the theological qualifications needed and separating the position of the *marji`a* from that of the *faqih*. This surprisingly was the separation of religion from politics! The rationalization of the office of the *velayat-e faqih*, however, did not lead to the ascendancy of democratic authority in the republic. Rather, it was a boost toward greater institutionalization of political absolutism.

On 3 June 1989 Khomeini died. The elected Assembly of the Experts appointed Ali Khamenei as the new leader of the Islamic Republic. Khomeini died; Khomeinism, however, survived and became routinized. The routinization of charisma and the succession brought some significant changes to the fate and future of the Khomeinist state. First, the religious power shifted from the institution of the *velayat-e faqih* to the religious seminaries, and yet the political authority of the *vali-ye faqih* remained over and above the religious authority of the *marja-e taqlid*. Second, power was concentrated, not in the hands of a *vali-ye faqih* but in the office of the *velayat-e faqih*. Third, the routinization of charisma transferred power, not to the people but to the more authoritarian conservative faction of the state.

III. KHOMAINISM AFTER KHOMAINI: MULTIPLE FACES OF KHOMAINISM

Ayatollah Khomeini was "a unique product of unique historical circumstances" and thus "irreplaceable." It was Ayatollah "Khomeini who made the institution of the *velayat-e faqih* powerful, not the other way around."⁷³ Khomeini's charisma was not transferable to a successor. His successor, Ali Khamenei, who was designated by the ruling clergy, had neither religious credentials nor a charismatic personality, in Max Weber's terms, to be "awakened" or "tested." Thus, unlike Khomeini, who depended on his own charismatic authority, Khamenei was dependent on his conservative peers. Ali Khamenei's "lack of an independent base of support was the critical factor in his selection as the *faqih*; he did not seem threatening to the rival factions. Aware of his shortcomings, Khamenei in the early stage of his rule stayed above factions."⁷⁴ And yet, because he lacked the character required for mediating between the rival factions and balancing their power, he became closer to the conservatives with whom he shared attitudes and was indebted to their support.

The first republic (1979–1989) of the Khomeinist state was essentially a "one-man show" dictated by Ayatollah Khomeini.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, in the post-Khomeini era, with no charisma in politics, no war, and growing domestic opposition, disagreements over sociopolitical issues divided the Khomeinist forces. The post-Khomeini state went through four different political periods: the second republic (1989–1997), the third republic (1997–2005), the fourth republic (2005–2013), and the fifth republic (2013). Each republic presented a different face of Khomeinism.

The second republic (1989–1997), under President Hashemi Rafsanjani, routinized the revolutionary charisma and institutionalized the office of the *velayat-e faqih*. The neoliberal policy of reconstruction (*sazandegi*) weakened the social base of the regime, escalated elite factionalism, and forced the regime to open up public space and allow a limited degree of sociopolitical liberalization. The politics of *sazandegi*, neoliberal Khomeinism, prioritized economic development over political development; it resembled a conservative revolution or, to use Barrington Moore's analytical concept, a "revolution from above."⁷⁶ The policy was far from a success because Iran in the mid-1990s was experiencing a growing socioideological disenchantment. Civil society managed to challenge the repressive intentions of the state. For conservatives, the harsh truth to accept was a growing gap between their sociocultural values and those of the youth, the postrevolutionary generation. The state had failed to create the man/women or the society Ayatollah Khomeini had envisioned. The youth were socioculturally disenchanted, politically disappointed, and economically dissatisfied.

Religious and secular intelligentsia posed serious intellectual challenges to the ideological foundations of Khomeinism. Abdolkarim Soroush challenged authoritarian religious thinking: clerics, like other "professional groups," hold a corporate identity, "a collective identity and shared interest," and thus possess no divine authority.⁷⁷ The rule of the *vali-ye faqih*, Mojtabeh Shabestari argued, is not divine and thus has to be subjected to democratic procedures. Ayatollah Montazeri came with a more accountable interpretation of the *velayat-e faqih*, suggesting that *velayat-e faqih* "does not mean that the leader is free to do whatever he wants without accountability."⁷⁸ The *vali-ye faqih* "we envisaged in the constitution has his duties and responsibilities clearly defined. His main responsibility is to *supervise*."⁷⁹ For Mohsen Kadivar, the "central question that the clergy faces today is whether it can preserve its independence . . . in the face of an Islamic state, since it does not want to fall victim to the fate of the Marxist parties of the former communist states."⁸⁰ He boldly argued that such a political version of the *velayat-e faqih* existed neither in the Qur'an, nor in the Prophet's, nor in the Shiite imam's traditions.⁸¹

By the late 1990s the intensity of Iran's factional politics was a fact, providing much opportunity for the unexpected victory of the reformist presidential candidate, Mohammad Khatami, on May 23, 1997. Khatami became the candidate for change and received the people's protest vote, making him a "Cinderella candidate"⁸² and eventually an "accidental president"⁸³ of the Islamic Republic. The reformist republic stood on three intellectual pillars: Islamic constitutionalism, promoting civil society, and Islamic democracy. All three intellectual pillars were bound to the lasting legacy of Khomeinism, which created a limited and inchoate subjectivity never independent of the *vali-ye faqih*. The fall of the reformist republic (1997–2005) symbolized in part the crisis of *Khomeinism with a human face*.

The 2005 presidential election marked a new era in the Khomeinist state—an era of "neo-conservative Khomeinism," which was consolidated in the June 2009 disputed presidential election. The president of Iran's fourth republic (2005–present), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was a product of the state-security apparatus, the office of the *velayat-e faqih*, and Iran's neoconservatives: a group of young members of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps cultivated in the postwar period. They attempted to revive the social base of the regime among the urban and rural poor, which has been eroded in the post-Khomeini era. The president of the fourth republic spoke about distributive social justice; promised to fight Iran's new class of mafia-like rentiers, the clerical noble-sons (*aghazadeh-ha*); and assured the poor they will bring the "oil money to their table." The irony is that neoconservative Khomeinists

were blessed by the state's rents and shadow economy run by the revolutionary foundations controlled by the office of the *velayat-e faqih*.⁸⁴ Their populist slogans were instrumental in serving their pragmatist purpose, that is, to replace the old oligarchy with a new one and to establish a populist, centralized state backed by the lower classes and sponsored by petro dollars.

It is widely believed that with the rise of Iran's neoconservatives to power the Islamic Republic's social base might shift from the coalition of the *mullah*-merchant to that of the revolutionary security and military forces. For the first time, a Khomeinist (ex)military man and not a Khomeinist *mullah* is the president of the republic. The conservatives, in spite of their internal conflicts, gained complete control of the republic, and the absolute rule of the *vali-ye faqih* Khamenei seemed at hand. However, for the first time in the Islamic Republic, the public and the reformist elites have openly challenged the authority and legitimacy of the *vali-ye faqih* in the popular democratic Green Movement. In the presidential elections on 14 June 2013, Hassan Rouhani, a moderate and pragmatist conservative, was elected as the seventh president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His four-year term, which started on 3 August 2013, brought to an end Iran's fourth republic (Ahmadinejad's presidency) and began Iran's fifth republic. (2013).

In addition to the nonideological, spontaneous, civic, and nonviolent characteristics of Iran's Green Movement, the movement is distinctive for its pluralism; it includes reformist Khomeinists and secular and Muslim post-Khomeinists. Many of the reformist Khomeinists, who accompanied Khomeini on his return to Iran, are now in open revolt. The process of "de-Khomeinization," they believe, has damaged Khomeini's legacy; today Khomeini's Islamic Republic is neither Islamic nor a republic.⁸⁵ The reformist Khomeinists seek a peaceful transformation within the Khomeinist system, while the political spectrum of the Green Movement is both broader and more radical than the reformist discourse. In addition to the quest for free elections and civil rights, it seems Khomeini's legacy of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* is no longer acceptable to the public. Three decades after the practice of Khomeini's ideology, his legacy is contested: for the reformist Khomeinists, "de-Khomeinization" captures the core of the crisis. For others, the nation has gradually moved toward a new era: "post-Khomeinism."

CONCLUSION: TOWARD POST-KHOMEINISM?

In his book *Kitab al 'Asfar* (Book of Journeys) the mystic-philosopher Molla Sadra discussed the "four journeys" of purification leading to a state of perfection. Khomeini was fascinated by this notion. He saw this (new) Platonic path of perfection as the path of the Prophet. In drawing upon Molla Sadra's "four journeys," Khomeini discussed this path of perfection in his lectures. The first journey is "from mankind to God" in which man leaves "the domain of human limitations" and purges his soul of all earthly desires. The second journey comes "with God in God"; this means man submerges himself in the oceans of secrets and mysteries to acquaint himself with the beauty of God. The third journey is from God to the people, when man returns to the people but is no longer separate from God, as he can now see His omnipotent essence. And the fourth journey is from people to people, in which man has acquired Godly attributes with which he can begin to guide and help others to reach God.⁸⁶

In this final stage the prophethood and the perfect man is realized; the perfect man is the imam and he is obliged to establish the *velayat* (guardianship) on earth, guiding the people and establishing an Islamic society. Ayatollah Khomeini's view of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* derives from his lifelong immersion in mysticism and (Platonic) philosophy, which rendered the absolute Truth, God's words, transparent to him. Such a mystic politician is an absolute *political* sovereign capable of overruling the *shari'ah*. He does not implement or interpret the *shari'ah*; he enjoys a full political agency/authority to act on behalf of the interest of the state. The interest and survival of the state/statesmen—*faqih*, not the *fiqh*—is the guiding principle of the Islamic state he envisioned. The events in postpresidential elections of June 2009 is a case in point where the doctrine of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* turns the Islamic Republic into a clerical leviathan accountable to itself, neither to God, nor people, nor human ethics.

Ayatollah Khomeini was a "master synthesizer." His life was full of contradiction. His thinking evolved over five distinct stages and his ideology was almost half a century in the making. Khomeini's transition from quietism to activism was prompted by the fear of secularism undermining the traditional role of the *ulama* in society. In the beginning, the form of state was not Khomeini's main concern as long as the *sharia* law was enforced. At the end, however, his theory of the absolute *velayat-e faqih* empowered the *vali-ye faqih* to unilaterally revoke *sharia* when it is contrary to the interests of the Islamic state.

Khomeini's most significant political legacy is the postrevolutionary Iranian regime, which can be divided into five Khomeinist republics, the nature of which has been "institutionally dissonant."⁸⁷ The state he created combined the theory of *velayat-e faqih* with republican institutions. The Khomeinist state is a mishmash of totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and (semi) democracy, while each republic presents a distinctive face of Khomeinism.⁸⁸ The first republic was essentially a "one-man show" dictated by Khomeini's populist and semitotalitarian politics. The absence of Khomeini's charisma in the second republic undermined the totalitarian character of the state, pushing the regime toward a limited degree of pluralism, while the crisis of legitimacy made the political system more authoritarian. The third republic aimed at refreshing the spirit of Iran's quest for democracy. However, the republic failed because it was bound by the institutional and intellectual legacy of Khomeini. The fall of the reformist republic was the failure of *Khomeinism with a human face*. The fourth republic was a product of the state-security apparatus, the office of the *velayat-e faqih*, and the extremist faction of Iran's conservatives, or *neoconservative Khomeinism*. The pragmatist president of the fifth republic challenged domestic and foreign policies of Ahmadinejd and has promised to pull Iran back from the brink of the negative economic growth, political repression, and international sanctions. It remains to be seen whether he is competent to accomplish this.

After three decades, Khomeini's legacy, the Islamic Republic of Iran, both is and is not what he envisioned. His legacy has been challenged at once by "de-Khomeinization" and "post-Khomeinism." For the reformist Khomeinists, "de-Khomeinization" was the official policy of the fourth republic.⁸⁹ Ayatollah Khomeini, it is argued, valued people's vote, recognized the *majlis* as the forefront of political affairs, encouraged open *ijtihad* in religious thinking, and discouraged the involvement of the Revolutionary Guards in politics. While there is some truth to this argument, it can be argued that Ayatollah Khomeini himself started the process of "de-Khomeinization" after he transformed his doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* into the absolute *velayat-e faqih*. Ayatollah Khomeini was, in fact, the first and last *vali-ye faqih* he envisioned!

More importantly, the rise of the Green Movement suggests that Iran has gradually entered into a new era of "post-Khomeinism," thanks to the crisis of an *Islamic state* and the practice of Khomeini's doctrine of *velayat-e faqih*. If Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of *velayat-e faqih* was a radical departure from the traditional Shi'a political thought, his political legacy has actually contributed to another paradigm shift in the current debates over the possibility and conditions of "post-Islamism" in general and "post-Khomeinism" in particular. According to Asef Bayat, post-Islamism "represents both a *condition* and a *project*." It refers to a *condition* where Islamism, here Khomeinism, "becomes compelled, both by its own internal contradictions and by societal pressure, to reinvent itself." It is also a *project*, "a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the rationale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual domains."⁹⁰ There is a continuity and change in Islamism and post-Islamism. Similar to Islamism, post-Islamism advocates the participation of religion in the public sphere. Contrary to Islamism, it rejects the concept of "Islamic state"; state is a secular entity no matter who the statesman is. Post-Islamism, post-Khomeinism in the Iranian context is a combination of "Islam *ism*" and "Islam *wasm*"!

NOTES

- * Another version of this essay appeared in one section of the following journal article: Mojtaba Mahdavi, "One Bed and Two Dreams? Contentious Public Religion in the Discourses of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati," *Studies in Religion* (2013; DOI: 10.1177/0008429813496102).
1. Hamed Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), 14.
 2. Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*, London (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), 46–47.
 3. The occultation of the last imam had two phases: the shorter phase and the complete occultation. During the first phase (874–941) four special deputies (*nuvvab-e khaas*) were in direct contact with the imam. After the death of the last deputy, the *ulama* have claimed to be the general deputies (*nuvvab-e aam*) of the imam.
 4. Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 11.
 5. Ali M. Ansari, *Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After* (London: Pearson Education, 2003), 225.
 6. Moein, *Khomeini: The Life of Ayatollah*, 56.
 7. The book's real target was "the 'renegade' clergymen who in Khomeini's eyes had 'actively collaborated with him.' Indeed, it was a direct response to an attack on the clerical establishment in a pamphlet called *Asrar-e Hezar Saleh* (Secrets of a Thousand Years) written by Hakamizadeh, the editor of *Homayon*. Hakamizadeh and his colleagues including Ahmad Kasravi were strongly disappointed with the religious establishment and its reactionary approach. See Baqer Moein, *Khomeini: The Life of Ayatollah*, 60–61.
 8. Khomeini, *Kashf al-Asrar*, (Tehran: Nashr-e Safar, 1941), 291
 9. Khomeini, *Kashf al-Asrar*, pp. 185–188, 226, quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Berkeley and London: 1993), p. 20
 10. Khomeini, *Kashf al-Asrar*, p. 185, quoted in Daniel Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran: The Struggle for Reform in Iran* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 58.

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11. The politics of quietism often benefited the shah. Ayatollah Buroujerdi, for example, congratulated the shah when he was brought back to power in 1953. Although, ayatollah Seyyed Abolqasem Kashani (1882–1962), Mojtaba Navab Safavi and his militant group, *Fadaiyan-e Islam*, believed in “political activism, Islamic universalism, anti-colonialism, and populism,” they soon withdrew their support from Mossadeq. Khomeini “was a frequent visitor to Kashani’s home.” Moreover, when Navab Safavi was arrested Khomeini asked the authorities not to harm him. See Moein, *Khomeini: The Life of Ayatollah*, 66.
12. According to Khomeini after he succeeded to overthrow the shah, Mosaddeq’s “main mistake was not to have got rid of the Shah when he was strong and the Shah was weak.” Khomeini, *Sahifeh-ye Nur*, 3:36, quoted in Moein, *Khomeini: The Life of Ayatollah*, 66.
13. Moein, *Khomeini: The Life of Ayatollah*, 68
14. Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 10
15. Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, 181.
16. *Ibid.*, 18.
17. Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 13–17.
18. Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 15.
19. Said Amir Arjomand, “Authority in Shiism and Constitutional Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende, eds., *The Twelver Shia in the Modern Times: Religious Culture and Political History* (Brill: Tuta Pallace, 2001), 301.
20. Khomeini, “Islamic Government,” in Hamed Algar, *Islam and Revolution*, 55.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Although Khomeini’s interpretation of the theory of the *velayat-e faqih* was new, the concept was not new to the Shiite tradition. For an insightful discussion, see Farhang Rajaei, *Khomeini on Man, the State and International Politics* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983).
23. Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, 75.
24. *Ibid.*, 124.
25. Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 16–17.
26. Algar, 42.
27. Huzeh-e Elmiyeh, *Zendeginameh-e Imam Khomeini* [A Biography of Imam Khomeini] (Tehran, n.d.), 95.
28. Hossein Bashiriyeh, *State and Revolution in Iran, 1962–1982* (Kent, UK: Croom Helm, 1984), 59–60.
29. Ayatollah Khomeini, *Khomeini va Jonbesh: Majmueh-ye Nameha va Sokhanraniha* [A Collection of Khomeini’s Letters and Speeches] (Tehran: n.p. 1352), 58–60, 68–69.
30. Ruhollah Khomeini, “October 31, 1971, The Incompatibility of Monarchy with Islam,” in Algar, 202.
31. Roy Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet: Learning and Power in Modern Iran* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1986.), 303. Moreover, waves of radical Islam reached Khomeini via young militant clerics influenced by Iran’s People’s Mojahedin Organization. Iranian student associations in Europe and North America, impressed by Shariati’s ideas, pushed Khomeini toward radicalism.
32. Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
33. In 1977, Khomeini’s elder son, Mostafa, died suddenly in Najaf, likely assassinated by the shah’s Security Police, SAVAK. Khomeini “bore this blow stoically,” as he termed the tragedy “a divine blessing in disguise.” The memorial ceremonies for Khomeini’s son

- in Iran became a starting point for renewed uprising by the theological seminaries and members of the Iranian religious society. The shah's regime took revenge, publishing an insulting article in the daily *Ettela'at* by attacking Khomeini as an agent of foreign powers. In reaction, the people in Qom displayed anger and frustration. This was the first of a series of revolutionary demonstrations that spread across the country. Hamed Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, 19–20.
34. Said Amir Arjomand, "Authority in Shiism and Constitutional Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran," 302.
 35. Ayatollah, Khomeini, *Velayat-e Faqih, Hokomat-e Islami* [The Rule of the Jurisprudent, Islamic Government] (Tehran: n.p. 1357), 28, 39–40, 77–79, quoted in Bashiriyeh, *State and Revolution in Iran*, 62–63.
 36. Ibid.
 37. According to one view, for Khomeini, the *vali-ye faqih* derives his *popularity* from people but his *legitimacy* is divine. Another interpretation suggests that both popularity and legitimacy of the *vali-ye faqih* derive from people, not God.
 38. Arjomand, "Authority in Shiism and Constitutional Development in the Islamic Republic of Iran," 302.
 39. Bazargan reluctantly accepted Khomeini's offer, hoping "he would be able to influence the new regime from within." See H. E. Chehabi, "The Provisional Government and the Transition from Monarchy to Islamic Republic in Iran," in Yossi Shain and Juan J. Linz, eds., *Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 135.
 40. Asghar Schirazi, *The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic*, John O'Kane, trans. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1997), 24.
 41. After the fall of Bazargan's government in late 1979 and the dismissal of President Banisadr in 1981, the short "spring of freedom" was replaced by a long season of fear and frustration. The regime shut down all political parties and arrested, executed, or jailed the opposition. According to Abrahamian, the figures for the execution of the opposition were 600 by September, 1,700 by October, and 2,500 by December 1981; see Ervand Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1989), 220.
 42. Quoted in Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*, 247.
 43. Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*, 105.
 44. Ibid., 100.
 45. Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict* (New York: Rutledge Chapman and Hall, 1991).
 46. Ansari, *Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After*, 239.
 47. Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," 181.
 48. Mehdi Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 72.
 49. Ibid.
 50. Ibid., 47.
 51. The conservative Khomeinists have been supported by the Society of Combatant Clergy (*Jame'eh Rouhaniyat-e Mobarez*) and the Allied Islamic Society (*Jamiat-e Mo'talefeh-ye Islami*).
 52. The revolutionary Khomeinists have been supported by the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization (*Sazman-e Mojahdin-e Enghelab-e Islami*) and the Society of Combatant Clerics (*Maj'ma-e Rouhaniyon-e Mobarez*). The central committee of the Islamic Republican Party, until its dissolution in 1986, was more inclined to the revolutionary Khomeinists and less to the conservatives.

53. Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*, 48–49.
54. Ibid., 65.
55. Khomeini also created a new institution; the Expediency Council (*Majma'e Tashkhis-e Maslehat-e Nezam*), an institutional mediator between the two Khomeinist camps in the *Majles* and the Guardian Council, paving the way for further institutionalization of the *velayat-e faqih*.
56. Khomeini, "Khomeini Ruling on State Powers Report," broadcast December 23, 1978, FBIS-NES-87, quoted in Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini*, 135.
57. "Khamene'i Delivers Friday Prayer Sermons," broadcast on Tehran Domestic-Service January 1, 1988, FBIS-NES-88-001, January 4, 1988, quoted in Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini*, 135.
58. *Ettela'at*, January 9, 1988, quoted in Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*, 74.
59. Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*, 260.
60. Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*, 135.
61. Ibid., 136.
62. Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*, 74.
63. Ibid.
64. Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*, 136.
65. Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*, 74.
66. Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*, 140.
67. Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*, 136–137.
68. Ahmad Khomeini, *Yadegar-e Imam*, 6:468, quoted in Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*, 270.
69. "Khomeini Message on Hajj, Resolution 598," broadcast July 20, 1988, FBIS-NES-88-140, July 21, 1988, quoted in Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*, 142.
70. For an insightful account of this event, see Ervand Abrahamian, *Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
71. The *vali-ye faqih* was given authority to delineate general policies and supervise the execution of decisions; to devise national referenda; to hold the supreme command of the armed forces; to declare war; to appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of the six jurists of the Guardian Council, the chief justice, the head of the national radio and television, the chief commanders of the Revolutionary Guard and of the armed forces. Moreover, Article 110 of the new constitution vested constitutional authority in the Expediency Council. In addition to its original task of acting as mediator between the *majlis* and the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council was elevated to a consultative body for the *vali-ye faqih*.
72. Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*, 294.
73. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution*, 225.
74. Milani, *The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution*, 224.
75. Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*, 143.
76. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (London: Penguin Press, 1966).
77. See Soroush, "Horriyyat va Rohaniyyat" [Liberty and Clergy], *Kiyan* 24, April–May 1995, 2–11, quoted in Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini*, 205.
78. "Montazeri on State's Road to Destruction," *London Keyhan*, October 10, 1994, EBIS-NES-94-231, October 10, 1994, quoted in Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini*, 215.
79. "Montazeri's Speech in Keyhan," December 4, 1997, available at <http://eurasianews.com/iran/montadres.html>, quoted in Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini*, 238.

80. Eric Rouleau, "La Republique Islamique d'Iran Confrontee a la Societe Civile," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 1995, available at <http://www.mondediplomatique.fr/1995/06/rouleau/1542.html>, quoted in Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini*, 238.
81. See Mohsen Kadivar, *Andisheh-ye Siyasi dar Islam* [Political Thought in Islam], vols. 1–2 (Tehran: Nay Publications, 1998).
82. Mohsen M. Milani, "Reform and Resistance in the Islamic Republic of Iran," in Esposito and Ramazani, eds., *Iran at the Crossroads*, 29.
83. Shaul Bakhash, "Iran's Remarkable Election," in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and D. Brumberg, eds., *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 119.
84. Ahmadinejad's colleagues such as Sadeq Mahsouli, minister of social welfare, and Mohammad Reza Rahimi, vice-president, among others, are members of the new oligarchy. The former is a billionaire real estate broker and the latter is another billionaire benefiting from exclusive political rents.
85. After the June 2009 events, Ayatollah Montazeri denounced *vali-ye faqih* Khamenei without mentioning his name. He explicitly argued, "This regime is neither Islamic nor a republic; it is a mere dictatorship. This is no longer the 'rule of the qualified faqih'; rather, it is the 'rule of the generals.'" Rasool Nafisi, "Where Is the Islamic Republic of Iran Heading?" *InsideIran*, September 23, 2009, available at <http://www.insideiran.org/clerics/where-is-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-heading>.
86. Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*, 49–50.
87. Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), chapter 5.
88. See Chehabi, "The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative Perspective," 48–70.
89. "Mir Hossein Mousavi's Interview with Kalameh," *Khordad88*, June 2, 2010, available at <http://khordad88.com/?p=1623#more-1623>.
90. Asef Bayat, *Islam and Democracy: What Is the Real Question?* (Leiden: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), 18–19.

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